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Chapter 
Introduction
One of the main ideas of multiagent systems MAS is to generate approxi
mative solutions to hard problems by distributing them to autonomous ratio
nal problem solvers agents that have local problem solving capabilities and
are able to nd a solution for the whole problem by cooperating with each
other Therefore MAS research has great interest in the coordination among
autonomous agents A convenient way of dealing with coordination is by re
garding it as negotiation among autonomous agents ChaibDraa   Hence
coordination and negotiation are two closely related subjects There is a signif
icant body of publications on coordination in general eg Corkill  Lesser 
Durfee  Durfee  Montgomery  Malone  Decker  Lesser  and on
negotiation in particular eg Sycara  Decker  Lesser  Steiner et al 
Conry et al   Lux  Steiner 	 which document the MAS perspective to
these subjects
When thinking about negotiation MAS researchers often adopt the ideas of
speech act theory which originate from Austin and Searle Austin 
 Searle 

The main idea underlying this approach is to regard communication among
autonomous agents as a special type of action aiming at modifying the men
tal state of the recipient of a message cf Cohen  Perrault 
 Perrault 
Bussmann  Muller  Lux 	 In this light making a specic utterance is
just one of many options an agent has when it decides which action to take next
negotiation thus is a process in which an agent tries to reach a specic goal by
means of performing a sequence of communicative acts
The aim of this report is to provide an introduction to the theoretical foundations
of rational decision making and to give an overview of how decision theory and
game theory relate to the eld of multiagent systems
The structure of the report is as follows we start with presenting the basic
framework of classic decision and game theory as it was dened by von Neumann
and Morgenstern von Neumann  Morgenstern  and continue with explaining
the approach of Rosenschein and Zlotkin Rosenschein  Zlotkin a to apply
game theory to multiagent systems Subsequently we look at the principles
	
of coordination mechanism design from an economic point of view and present
several auctionbased allocation mechanisms Finally the transportation domain
is introduced as an application example in order to show the importance of the
presented concepts in realworld multiagent applications We conclude this report
with a brief review of the presented concepts and how they can be used to enable
a social welfare maximising coordination within multiagent systems composed of
selfinterested agents
The following paragraphs give a brief summary of the chapters of this report
Decision and Game Theory The general objectives of decision theory are
to provide formal mathematical models for decision situations to analyse them
according to their special properties to develop adequate denitions of notions
like solution or rational decision and to provide methods for the computation
of solutions and the design decision rules for rational action selection in decision
situations In particular the concepts of game theory eg for the rational be
haviour of an agent are not derived from psychological considerations but solely
from the formal structural properties of the abstract decision situation Game
theory can be viewed as a specic branch of decision theory as it concerns deci
sion situations where the consequences of actions depends on the actions of other
agents Therefore the concepts and methods of decision theory also hold for the
decision situations occuring in game theory Decision theory characterises deci
sion problems and their solutions by the consequences of rules and interaction
patterns of the participating agents The interest in decision theory is not only
motivated by the need for constructive advice and decision rules for specic de
cision problems but also for the design and analysis of organisational structures
allocationmechanisms voting procedures conict management etc After a brief
history and motivation of decision theory in Section   the basic concepts of
decision and game theory are outlined and decision situations are classied Sec
tion  discusses classic decision theory by presenting general decision rules for
singleagent decisionmaking In Section  constantsum games nonconstant
sum games and iterated games are examined using some wellknown examples
Section  concludes the chapter with a discussion of the formation of coalitions
and the distribution of prot in the nplayer case
Game Theory in Multiagent Systems A major contribution of Rosen
schein and Zlotkin was to transfer abstract game theoretic concepts to multi
agent applications Zlotkin  Rosenschein  Rosenschein  Zlotkin a We
present their classication of multiagent domains into a threelevel hierarchy Sec
tion   Furthermore we discuss the chances for cooperation and the incentive
for deception in these classes of domains and examine whether there exist incen
tive compatible mechanisms that serve to prevent deception Section  We
concentrate on the class of taskoriented domains which we need for the charac


terisation of our example domain in Chapter 	
Coordination Mechanism Design The problem of designing auctionbased
coordination mechanisms for autonomous agents is addressed from an economic
viewpoint as presented in Ru  The central question is how to solve the
allocation problem in a setting where the agents are selfinterested ie are willing
to betray other agents for their own benet The adequate way of dealing with
selsh agents is the use of mechanisms that enforce truthful bidding strategies
After a brief introduction to the theory of mechanism design in Section  
we provide a classication of auction protocols Section  Subsequently we
shortly discuss the most popular auction mechanisms before we introduce several
more sophisticated mechanisms based on the Vickrey principle
Application Example The transportation domain is presented as an appli
cation example The domain is characterised as a taskoriented domain following
the framework described in section   However we come up with the result that
it is useful to divide the class of taskoriented domains into the two subclasses
of cooperative and competitive taskoriented domains For both of them the
transportation domain provides examples The cooperative setting characterises
the situation within one shipping company where the main problem consists in
a complex scheduling problem namely to distribute orders to a set of trucks in
an optimal manner In the competitive setting several transportation companies
compete on tasks and prot Furthermore we analyse the applicability of some
of the auctionbased negotiation protocols presented in Chapter 
Conclusion We give a brief overview of how the presented concepts adjust to
each other and discuss to what extend they can help to to provide a theoreti
cal foundation for coordination which maximises social welfare of selfinterested
agents

Chapter 
Decision and Game Theory
  Introduction
The general objectives of decision theory are to provide formal mathematical
models of decision situations to analyse them according to their special proper
ties to develop adequate denitions of notions like solution or rational deci
sion and to design methods for the computation of solutions and decision rules
for rational action selection in decision situations In particular the concepts de
veloped within decision theory eg for the rational behaviour of an agent did
not originate from psychological considerations but were derived solely from the
formal structural properties of the abstract decision situation Decision theory
is able to characterise decisionproblems and their solutions by the consequences
of rules and interaction patterns of the participating agents The interest in de
cision theory is motivated by the need for constructive advice and decision rules
for specic decision problems Additionally it helps to design and to analyse
organisational structures allocation mechanisms voting procedures and conict
management
While the notion of decision theory is not dened consistently in literature we
will view decision theory in this report as comprising classic decision theory
ie decision situations involving one agent as well as game theory where the
situation is characterised by several agents whose decisions are not independent
of each others
The classical decision situation can be sketched as follows an agent has to select
one action from a set of alternative actions The result of the selected action may
depend on factors the decisionmaker is not able to control In deciding to select
an action the agent has to rank the dierent expected results which depend
on the expected future state of the environment and then has to determine
a preference ordering for the dierent possible actions based on its goals and
preferences
Game theory considers situations where several agents simultaneously select one

out of several actions which are called strategies in this context So far the
classic situation is just duplicated but the new feature is that the outcome for
each agent is not independent from the strategies selected by the other agents
Therefore each agent should consider what the other agents might do which
of course crucially depends on their goals preferences and assumptions about
other agents decisions This involves a recursive reasoning about other agents
reasoning which can lead to paradoxical situations in game theory
The classic single agent decision situation can be looked upon as a game of an
agent against nature where nature denotes a probability distribution of future
world states which is independent of the decision the agent takes The nature
agent thus represents an ignorant player that bases its decision purely on a
probability distribution On the other hand from a solipsistic point of view an
agent in a game could regard the actions of all other agents as environmentally
determined future states and base its decision on classic decision theoretic single
agent considerations This shows the relation between the two domains
The structure of this chapter is as follows in the following paragraphs we provide
a brief overview of the history of decision theory and make some remarks concern
ing the motivation for decision theory especially in the context of planning This
leads to the discussion of dierent epistemological approaches that have been
developed in decision theory Subsequently we explain the terminology and the
basic model of decision making and provide a classication of decision situations
We conclude the introduction section by illuminating the fundamental concepts
of game theory
In Section  decision situations for oneperson decision problems are classied
into decisions with certainty decisions with risk and decisions with uncertainty
For the later two some standard decision rules are discussed
In Section  some classical examples are utilised to illustrate the properties
of twoperson games Constantsum nonconstantsum and iterated games are
discussed
Finally in Section  the aspects of nperson game theory are discussed coali
tion forming and distribution of payo between the coalition partners
  Historical Overview
The historical roots of decision theory date back to the middle of the  th cen
tury when bored French aristocrats enjoyed to waste their time with gambling
Hoping to increase their winnings some of themtogether with more educated
contemporariesput great eort into the deep analysis of the strategic and sys
tematic rules underlying these games As a result elementary principles for deal
ing with probabilities were discovered and laid the basis for probability theory
From these origins the probability calculus and on that basis modern statistics
were developed
First important contributions to the theory of strategic games came up at

the beginning of our century by Zermelo   but initially failed to meet ma
jor attention Thus the analysis of strategic games lacked general attention
until in   the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Os
kar Morgenstern published their Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour
von Neumann  Morgenstern  This was the rst time that the analysis of
strategic games met with public interest especially from economists and math
ematicians Therefore these researchers are considered to be the initiators of
modern wellfounded game theory
The book Games and Decisions of Luce and Raia Luce  Raia 	 later suc
ceeded in introducing decision theory into the areas of social science and psychol
ogy While before  	 only a few empirical investigations about the behaviour
of people in strategic decision situations where published after the publication
of this book a constantly growing research area of experimental games evolved
Here more or less abstract variations of the persongame known as prisoners
dilemma cf Section  dominated research until the middle of the s then
the focus was shifted to other person and nperson games
   Motivation
The primary motivation for building a theory that provides mathematical foun
dations and methods to formally analyse and explain the structure of various
decision situations is based on the hope to understand the decision behaviour of
people and to nd better ways to cope with decision situations when they occur
in real life The classical basic decision situation confronts an agent with several
action alternatives The agent has to react by selecting one of these actions hope
fully that one that maximises its satisfaction in the environmental state achieved
by the action Therefore the agent bases its decision on its goals its prefer
ences and its model about the world ie the relevant objects their relations to
each other the eects of operations and the interplay of all these Additional
complexity may be added to this situation in various ways eg by considering
incomplete knowledge or uncertainty about the development of the environment
or by considering several agents in cooperative or competitive relations
While all this is treated in decision theory it is important for the motivation of
the theory to ask Where does the decision situation come from This ques
tion puts the decision situation into an application context and depending on
the domain and description level of this context several answers may occur One
possible example that will be considered in the following is the context of plan
ning because it is suciently abstract to comprise several situations Planning
is reasoning about future states of the world and how to achieve them This
presupposes a representation of the world and a function for appraising dierent
possible world states based on an internal valuation by the agent A problem
initially arises from a dierence between the actual state of the world as it is
perceived by the agent and a world state that the agent aims to achieve based
 
on its wishes aims and goals The following steps will be necessary to prepare
decision situations
  Domain model object system In most nontrivial cases of realworld prob
lems an appropriate model of the domain initially does not exist but has to
be developed using methods from organisational research and system anal
ysis A problem like How can we achieve that the accounting department
of our company works more eciently can only be solved if we are able
to describe how the accounting department is working at all What are the
relevant objects and by which attributes are they characterised What are
the relations between them Which processes are performed by whom and
what are the necessary resources What are the interfaces to other systems
Which parameters will inuence the system into which direction Design
decisions taken during this process of the representation of the domain may
have important inuences on the decision situations occurring later on in
the process of planning
  Goal system based on this model the goal has to be specied What are
the criteria that appropriately measure the eciency of the departments
work Eciency has to be described in terms of measurable parameters
ie we have to break down the goal into subgoals that allow us to rank
the achievement of a goal by access to specic goal criteria measurability
This problem also known as operationalisation of the goals may also in
volve that subgoals interact with each others and the problem of how the
goal criteria can be scaled and accumulated to obtain a uniform measure
for the overall goal Subgoals should cover all aspects of the overall goal
completeness and on the other hand should not cover certain aspects by
several subgoals no redundancy Again the decisions taken in this step
may provide important constraints for the following steps
  Decision eld Planning in the narrow sense is necessary to develop the
decision eld which formally could be described as a mapping of states
and actions to results A set of possible actions presumably predetermined
by technical organisational legal or any other type of constraints of the
system has to be developed and the expected transformations of the system
according to these actions must be estimated Anticipation of future states
of the system extends the object model to a prognostic model The focus
will be on those actions that have a crucial eect on the goal criteria
  Valuing of Alternatives The result of an action will usually comprise a
bundle of eects on dierent objects features and attributes of the sys
tem The goal system determines the relevant criteria for the evaluation
While the overall goal is to obtain a unique utility measure for each alter
native action the problems of the numerical measurement of those criteria
  
involve questions of collecting data mapping them onto appropriate scales
and combining dierent scales eg nominal ordinal or cardinal scales
Methods from management science like cost benet analysis or cost eec
tiveness analysis come into play if a monetary valuation of the results is
possible Subjective preferences will unavoidably inuence the utility func
tions Thus if several agents are involved in the decision process
 
 it has
to be negotiated about their individual preferences Furthermore dierent
degrees of determinateness must be treated due to lack of information or
due to the fuzziness of attribute values
  Selection Finally the selection of one alternative action is guided by the
decision logic of the deciding agent The decision rules which we will present
in Section  show that dierent rules may lead to dierent decisions Their
main dierences are due to the parameters they use to model the agents
willingness to take risky decisions
It should be noted that complex strategic planning problemseg increasing the
eciency of an organisation by a process of several steps of reorganisation


are obviously far from being solved by the selection of one basic action The
implementation and supervision of a solution to problems of this kind often reveal
discrepancies between the reality and the model which may enforce iterations of
the steps presented above
  Epistemological Goals of Decision Theory
The previous section reveals that multifaceted problems occur in the context
of decision situations From an epistemological point of view it is a matter
of discussion what intentions are pursued and which kind of results should be
delivered from a science considering decision situations Should decision theory
be treated as a formal tool box for obtaining intrinsic truths in the style of
mathematics and logic Should it result in rules and advice telling how rational
decisions are taken Should it dene or examine rationality Should it describe
and explain what people in real decision situations are doing Several dierent
directions of decision theory grew out of these questions
The approach of formal decision theory is very close to the methodology
of mathematics It tries to discover fundamental structural relationships and
causalities based only on the formal denitions of decision situations and some
basic axioms dening rational behaviour This formal approach builds the kernel
for several branches in which decision theory split up
 
Mechanisms for bargaining voting and electing are another important domain demanding
decision theoretic foundations

eg retraining of employees investment into computer equipment etc
 
Normative Decision Theory
Normative decision theory is based on fundamentally rational acting agents pos
tulate of rationality Its goal is to provide instructions for an agent to act in
a rational manner when the premises of the decision are given
The normative approach tries to develop very basic and insightful axiom systems
of rational behaviour for dierent types of decision situations This is important
because the rational behaviour of maximising utility ceases to be a simple concept
when several goal criteria other agents goals and actions or uncertainty come
into play
Criteria and rules for the appraisal of alternative actions according to those ax
ioms are derived The normative approach of decision theory claims to be con
structive ie to provide advice for an agent in a decision situation how to decide
according to some welldened axioms of rationality
Its goal does not include to show how decisions indeed are made by human beings
in real life The models used do not consider how to obtain the premises of
decisions how to obtain the necessary informations or how the decision process
is inuenced by the environment Therefore the models of normative decision
theory are referred to as closed models
The concept of rationality is central for normative decision theory and the inter
pretation of rationality is therefore of major importance
  In a general interpretation the only requirement for the agents goal system
is that it is free of contradictions Because no further requirements about
the substantial contents are demanded this is called formal rationality
  In addition to this substantial rationality can only be dened in re
lation to another referential goal system ie substantial rationality can
only be evaluated according to another notion of rationality dened by the
referential goal system
A referential goal system might be dened for example as a common goal system
of several agents of a society It can be the case that an agent acts formally
rational according to its own goal system but substantially irrational according
to the common referential goal system Moreover it can be distinguished between
  objective rationality if the decisions of an agent base on an objective
representation of the world ie if he models a decision situation in the
same way as an objective observer would do it
  subjective rationality if the decisions of an agent base not on an objective
representation of the world but only on a restricted subjective representa
tion of the world
 
An aspect often neglected in closed models is that information gathering con
sumes resources and thus increases costs in practice Therefore a rational deci
sion in addition to considering the utility of the dierent results should also take
into account these costs of gathering information This could lead to situations
where the expected costs of gathering additional informations to the model is
greater than the expected gain of utility that might be achieved in using the
more informed model in comparison to the less informed one
In the sense of the normative approach most human decisions are considered
to be not rational The normative model is a formal deductive approach which
bases on a basic set of axioms dening rational behaviour Therefore it must be
distinguished from an approach to analyse human decision behaviour inductively
based on descriptions of real decision situations and their specic contexts
Descriptive Decision Theory
Descriptive decision theory represents an inductive and pragmatic approach that
starts with the description of real decision behaviour of people in decision situa
tions and analyses the consequences of decisions It takes into account that the
rationality of an individual in practice is bounded due to the limited capability
of obtaining and processing information This approach aims at the explanation
of human decision behaviour in real situations
For this purpose the analysis of the origins of the decision premises and the
relations between the deciding agent and its environment are of major interest
Descriptive models are denoted as open models because they explicitly consider
the decision environment and the bounded rationality of real agents They do
not apriory exclude nonrational decision behaviour and therefore are sometimes
considered as the more comprising and more general approach On the other
hand the normative theory can often give a more concrete guidance for making
rational decisions though it neglects many social and psychological aspects of
human decision making
Synthesis A Prescriptive Decision Theory
Prescriptive decision theory tries to provide a synthesis of normative and descrip
tive approaches by working with empirical data of real decision behaviour without
neglecting the normative aspects In contrast to the pure normative approach it
also considers the origins of the decision premises as well as empirically observ
able deviations from the rational behaviour eg caused by limited capabilities
of gathering informations Crucial questions involved in a decision like
  How do decision problems originate
  How does the deciding agent obtain the premises of its decision
  How are the agent and its environment inuenced by each other
 
can only be considered if an open system model is used On the other hand de
scriptions of decision processes and analyses of their consequences do not provide
rules or recommendations for an agent in the actual decision situation The pre
scriptive approach tries to provide normative instructions for agents in decision
situations based on a situationspecic concrete preference behaviour
Nevertheless the decisiontheoretic concepts that will be presented in the rest of
this report originate from formal and normative decision theory
  The Basic Model
In this section the terminology and the most basic denitions of decision theory
are introduced The basic model of decision theory is presented and its compo
nents are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs
The basic model in decision theory see Figure   distinguishes between the
decision taker subject system and the environment object system and
interprets the decision process as an interaction between these systems The
subject system can be further subdivided into the information system the
decision logic and the goal system
            Object System
   Decision Field
 Natural Laws
           Goal
 System
   Subject System
Information 
System
Informations                                 Actions
     Decision
Logic
Figure   Basic Model of Decision Theory
The object system implements the representation of all relevant aspects of the
environment The subjects information system receives informations about the
environment and probably providesby aggregation or preevaluationthe data
that might inuence the agents decision According to its goal system the agent
subject system uses its decision logic in order to select one of the possible
actions This action then will transform the object system into the desired state
The decision logic is responsible to take a rational decision on the basis of the
given goal and the actual state of the object system perceived via the information
system
 	
Decision Field
The decision eld is dened as a triple AZ e where
A  fa
 
 a

     a
n
g is the action space ie the set of all possible alter
native actions
Z  fz
 
 z

     z
m
g is the state space ie the set of all possible future
states of the environment
e with x
ij
 ea
i
 z
j
 is the result function which maps every action and
every state of the environment to a result
The action space has to obey the principle of perfect alternatives which
means
  all possible actions must be represented entirely principle of complete
ness such that the agent is forced to choose one of the actions Even
doing nothing has to be represented explicitly by a specic nilaction if
necessary
 all actions must exclude the other ones principle of exclusion which
means that no action overlaps with another one from the action space
Only one of the alternatives can be selected
An instance of all relevant factors of the environment is called an environmental
state Analogous to the action space the state space has to ensure mutual
exclusion of the dierent states and a complete representation of all possible
states Thus the model requires that in a decision situation exactly one action
is selected and exactly one state of the environment occurs The result of an
action in a specic environmental state is encoded in the result function e which
maps action a
i
depending on the state z
j
to the result x
ij
 In general a result
will be a vector of values representing dierent types of attributes like time cost
payo etc The result function can be represented in form of a result matrix
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Knowledge about the probabilities of the occurrence of future environmental
states can be obtained via the information system
 

Information System
The availability of information about the future environmental states can be
classied in the following way
  A complete information system represents the set of all possible states
Z  fz
 
 z

  z
m
g and additionally knows in advance which future state
will occur ie it knows for sure the environmental state in which the result
of the decision has to be evaluated In this case of a decision under
certainty the result matrix degenerates to a table with a single column
and the result solely depends on the selected action
 An incomplete information system comprises the possibility of
  a decision under risk if the set of possible states is known but
for each state z
i
the only additional information is the probability of
its occurrence P z
i
 such that
P
m
i 
P z
i
    The result of an ac
tion is therefore only known statistically depending on the probability
distribution of the environmental states
  a decision under uncertainty if no information about the proba
bility of the future states is available The set of states Z just lists
possible environmental states without any hint about the frequencies
of their occurrences
Goal System
The goal system contains the goals of the deciding agent ordered according to
the preferences he associates with the dierent goals eg minimisation of cost or
maximisation of prot Without a precise and clear notion of the goals an agent
is unable to make rational goaloriented decisions Therefore the design of the
goal system is of crucial importance
The goal system has to meet several requirements as for example the condition
of measurability This means that the degree of achievement of a goal can
be exactly measured by the value of a certain goal variable For example if the
decision problem consists of selecting one of two possible routes connecting city
X with city Y and the goal is to minimise the length of the route then the
achievement of the goal is exactly measurable by the amount of kilometres of the
driven distance On the other hand when the goal is to select a good residence
it is not possible to measure the achievement of such an abstract general goal
without dening a goal hierarchy cf Eisenfuhr  Weber  ie splitting
the goal into several measurable subgoals like for example minimal distance to
downtown minimal distance to the place of work quietness few through trac
and so on Furthermore the goal system has to specify the preferences given to
these dierent subgoals
 
Another requirement to the goal system is that the goals do not overlap with each
other lack of redundancy because if several goals encode the same thing
it might be the case that by the preferences assigned to the goals something
implicitly is weighted much more than originally intended Like eg in the above
example the goals few through trac and quietness may at least partially
overlap
Other preconditions to the goal system are completeness independence and
simplicity For further considerations about the design of goal systems and for
more examples we refer to Eisenfuhr  Weber 
Comparability of Results
As mentioned above the results obtained from the result function in general will
be vectors of several values because an action usually will eect several features
of the environment and a decision will take into account several criteria Problems
occur when dierent attributes of the possible results recommend dierent actions
to select according to dierent subgoals
The following example shows the conict Consider a situation where a shipping
company has to drive from city X to city Y  There are two possible routes one
is short but often a little bit congested the other one is longer but rarely used
by anyone The action space consists of driving either on the rst or the second
route A  fr
 
 r

g The state space represents a situation with no congestion
z
 
and another one with a congestion on the rst route z

 The result function
considers time and distance as shown in the following result matrix
z
 
z

r
 
		 min  km   min  km
r

 min  km  min  km
Trying to minimise the length of the route driven would recommend to select
r
 
in any of the possible states The goal to minimise time used to execute the
transportation task would lead to the selection of r
 
in the case that state z
 
is
known to occur In the case of state z

the route r

should be selected If now the
goal is to minimise both time and distance we will select the better alternative
r
 
assuming z
 
to occur because it is better in both attributes But in the case of
knowing z

to occur it is not clear from the result matrix which action to select
because both attributes recommend dierent actions to choose
When selecting an action alternative depending on the values of several attributes
we use in the rst place the principle of dominance


Alternative a dominates alternative b if at least for one attribute the
value of a is better than that of b while for all other attributes the
values of a are not worse than that of b

A formal denition of the gametheoretical term dominance will be given in Section 
 
It is clear that if a dominates b then a should be selected In our example this
is the case in a certain decision knowing z
 
to occur r
 
dominates r

 because 		
min is better than  min and  km is not worse than  km
In the case of a certain decision assuming z

to occur the notion of dominance
does not help anymore because none of the alternatives dominates the other
one Because of the dierent measuring units time in min distance in km the
values are not comparable The common approach used in decision theory to
overcome this problem is to apply a utility function ux
ij
  u
ij
that maps
each result x
ij
to a utility u
ij
encoding the gain that the agent ascribes to the
result Utility is a uniform comparable and substitutable unit eg measured
in the pecuniary units of the prot gained for the result In our example this
approach has to answer the questions How much does each additional kilometre
cost and How much does each additional minute cost The utility function
has to encode these questions The application of the utility function to each
result in the result matrix transforms it to the decision matrix It should be
noted that the utility function has to encode the preferences the agent associates
to the dierent results While the results might comprise dierent incomparable
and nonsubstitutable attributes the utilities are by denition comparable and
substitutable Therefore these qualities are kind of articially imposed by the
utility function which shows why the design of a utility function is the most
essential part for the agent to take rational decisions
In the example above certain decision in state z

 it might be that the shipping
company associates costs of   unit per each additional kilometre but only  
units for each additional minute Then the prot of the order is reduced by 
units in the case of r
 
and by  units in the case of r

 This will recommend
to select r
 
 On the other hand if a deadline is associated with the order which
species a substantial penalty for delivering the goods too late the utility function
has to encode the costs of additional time in a nonlinear way which in our example
might recommend to select the faster route r


Classication of Decision Situations
This section provides an overview of the area of decision and game theory and
presents major criteria to classify dierent decision situations It is not possible
here to illuminate all branches of the area in detail References to more specic
literature for the interested reader will be given A classication of decision
situations can be done according to the following issues
  The number of goals to be used as decision criteria It should be possible
to measure the attainment of a goal by considering the value of a specic
attribute of the environment In the case of several goals several attributes
must be considered A balanced mixture of their values will contribute to
the utility Merging dierent attribute values into a unique measure of util
ity is denoted as value aggregation It is often convenient for the model
 
but unfortunately rarely adequate for realistic decision problems to as
sume that the preferences for values of one attribute are independent from
the values of another attribute Several methods make the even stronger
assumption that the units of measurement for the attributes are mutually
substitutable This presupposes a kind of mapping the values of dierent at
tributes onto a monetary unit of utility via an aggregation function Linear
aggregation functions are used for example in the Multi Attribute Util
ity Theory MAUT cf egFrench  and in the method of Analytic
Hierarchy Process AHP cf Saaty 
  The mode of uncertainty about the decision situation in a secure deci
sion a state s
i
is known to occur for sure ie P s
i
    Therefore the
decisionmatrix degenerates to a single column A decision under risk is
dened by an environment where the probabilities P s
i
 of the occurrences
of the dierent situations s
i
are known a priory From the principle of
completeness it follows that
P
i
P s
i
    holds A decision is made under
uncertainty if even such a probability is unknown Decision problems under
uncertainty are sometimes handled like situations under risk by assigning
some subjective probabilities to the dierent possible situations Encoding
the expectations about the results of dierent possible future states of the
world into a unique measure of utility is denoted as result aggregation
Several rules for decisions under risk are encountered in literature which
mainly dier according to the parameters modelling the agents willingness
to take more or less risky decisions Some popular decision rules for situa
tions involving risk and uncertainty are discussed in Section 
  The number of agents involved in a decision originally only single agent
decisions were considered within decision theory Single agent scenarios are
sometimes viewed as games against the environment because the environ
mental state is besides the agent the only factor inuencing the result Most
emphasise is put into the design of the utility function which has to im
plement reasonable mechanisms for value and result aggregation Thereby
methods from statistics and probability theory are used
If several agents are involved we can distinguish between collective decisions
and game theoretic settings
 In collective situations a group of agents has to make a common deci
sion Dierent preferences for attribute values dierent goal priorities
or dierent views about the probability of possible states have to be
reconciled by negotiation or an appropriate voting mechanism
Models of negotiation and bargaining are related to the work of
Zeuthen Zeuthen  and treat bargaining as a process of conver
gence over time involving a sequence of oers and counter oers These

models assume that the utility functions of the participants are xed
and known from the outset and that a compromise zone exists which
can be identied and remains stable over time cf Young 	
An interesting result about voting mechanisms cf Schoeld 	 is
Arrows Theorem of Impossibility Arrow 
 which concludes that
any preferenceaggregation for more than  alternatives cannot obey
some rather intuitive and reasonable postulates of rationality
 In game theory cf eg Rauhut et al  all decisions must explic
itly take into consideration the reactions of opponents Each player
tries to maximise its utility usually called payo in game theory
which leads to conicts especially when the winnings of one player
correspond to the loss of another One can distinguish game theoretic
models according to the number of players the dependency of the
payos given to the players the degree of cooperation versus compe
tition the information available to the players the kind and number
of strategies allowed to play and the inuence of randomness
In twoperson games the result is determined by both players and both
players are aware of their own and the opponents possible utilities
which are represented in a payo matrix Therefore strategic consid
erations and reasoning about the opponents action come into play
This can lead to paradoxical situations where rational agents are un
able to cooperate and are forced to select actions that result in a non
optimal payo
Scenarios with more than two players are characterised by the pos
sibility of building cooperative coalitions Viewing a coalition as an
agreed company reduces the number of dierent parties such that
these scenarios in principle iteratively can be reduced to twoplayer
games Nevertheless new problems arise concerning the questions
which coalitions should emerge and how the payo of a coalition should
be distributed to its participants
Iterated games can also be used to model evolutionary aspects see eg
Axelrod  The concept of evolutionary stable strategies ESS cf
MaynardSmith  is a useful concept to explain the emergence of
agent behaviour as for example in the case of animals the institution
of a dominance hierarchy the territorial and mating behaviour or the
behaviour in animal ghts cf Dawkins 

   Single Agent Decisions
An agent uses its decision logic to take decisions which gain maximal payo The
decision logic includes parameters expressing the willingness to run higher risks
 
or representing its optimism In this section we present a number of decision
rules that allow to take rational decisions according to the risk preferences of
the agent Thereby according to the classication of the knowledge about the
environment we will distinguish in the following
  Decisions under certainty where the agent knows which environmental state
will occur
  Decisions under risk where the agent knows the probabilities of the occur
rence of the dierent environmental states
  Decisions under uncertainty where the agent only knows that one of the
possible environmental states will occur but has no hint about the proba
bilities of occurrence
In the following we will consider these cases and present some decision rules
especially for the case of decisions under uncertainty
   Decisions under Certainty
In this case the result matrix reduces to one column that one that represents
the environmental state which is known to occur The most simple case is the
optimisation of one of the attributes of the result or of a goal that depends
on one attribute in a simple way Then the selection rule is to select the
action whose result optimises minimises or maximises depending of what this
value expresses that attribute value If our goal depends on several of the result
features the rst thing is to delete all alternatives that are dominated

by others
These alternatives are also called nonecient For the remaining alternatives
a selection can only be made according to the preferences the agent associates
with the dierent results These are often introduced by a utility function that
assigns a unique substitutable unit comparable to a currency to the results so
that they can be compared to each other using their utility It should be noted
that the design of a utility function might involve several other problems not
elaborated here in detail eg concerning the type scale and measurement of
attributes or the dependencies of the preferences between dierent attributes In
the following we assume that multiattributed results are already mapped onto
appropriate utility values
    Decisions under Risk
For each environmental state z
i
 the agent knows the probability P z
i
 of its
occurrence such that
P
m
i 
P

z
i
    holds It is of minor concern here how these

confer Section 	 for the denition of the dominancerelation

probabilities are obtained cf remarks about normative and descriptive decision
theory in Section   because the selection rules just assume them as given a
priori Nevertheless the deciding agent should keep in mind whether they are
objectively real like the probability of throwing a six in a game of dice based
on empirical data or just subjective estimations In the following two rules are
exemplied
Bayes Rule This rule recommends to select the action with the maximal
expected value The expected value  is the sum of the utilities of the dierent
states weighted by the probability of these states The following table shows an
example
P z
 
   P z

  
z
 
z

expected value 
a
 
       !     
a

        !       

In this example a
 
will be selected because of its greater expected utility Bayes
rule is indierent to the agents acceptance of risk which becomes clear if we
assume P z
 
  P z

  	 in the above example In this case the expected
values of both alternatives are equal to  which means that none of the actions
is prefered by Bayes rule An agent with preference to risk will prefer a

in this
situation because there is an opportunity to gain  units of utility while an agent
which prefers security will omit this opportunity in selecting a
 
but therefore will
be sure of gaining  units of utility in any of the cases z
 
or z


Rule The rule represents the agents preference towards risk by decre
menting or incrementing  by a  where  denotes the standard deviation of the
probability distribution and a denotes a parameter encoding the agents preference
for risk A positive value for a increases the preference towards risk a negative
value for a encodes a preference for security The expected value modied in this
way "  ! a   is used for the selection of the action
   Decisions under Uncertainty
These situations are characterised by the fact that no probabilities can be as
sociated with the dierent environmental states Most of the rules for this case
found in literature dier in their assumptions about the agents preference to
wards risk In the examples we always show the application of the rule to the
following decision matrix

z 
z

z

a
 
  	 	
a

   	
a

   	 
The MaximinRule This rule recommends the action that provides maximal
utility for the occurrence of the worst case environmental state Therefore one
has to operate as follows For each action look for the state that provides minimal
utility From these utilities choose the action with the maximal value In short
this rule selects the action that provides the maximum of the minima of each
row of the matrix which explains the name of the rule that sometimes is also
referred to as Waldrule In the example this rule will lead to the selection of a


z
 
z

z

min of row
a
 
  	 	 	
a

   	   
a

   	   
Because this rule always expects the worst case environmental state it has a
strong preference for security and against risk
The MaximaxRule As the name reveals this rule is the inverse of the pre
vious one in that it selects the action with maximal gain presupposing the occur
rence of the most favourable environmental state Therefore it is an optimistic
selection rule It recommends the selection of the action that provides the maxi
mum from the maximal values of each row which in the example is a
 

z
 
z

z

max of row
a
 
  	 	 	 
a

   	 	
a

   	  
The HurwiczRule PessimisticOptimisticRule This rule combines
the maximinrule with the maximaxrule via the parameter      which
encodes the agents optimism respectively pessimism For     the rule degen
erates to the maximaxrule while for    it coincidences with the maximinrule
As in the previous rules the maxima and minima of each row are considered

These values are merged together by adding them where the maxima will be
weighted with  while the minima are weighted with     The action with
the maximal resulting value is selected For the example we assume   
z
 
z

z

max of row min of row weighted sum
a
 
  	 	 	 	 	   ! 	     
a

   	 	   	   !       
a

   	        !        
In this case the maximal value of   leads to the selection of a

 It should be
pointed out that the action nally recommended to select crucially depends on
the parameter  This is why the last three examples all recommend dierent
actions
The SavageNiehansRule The SavageNiehansrule is also known as the
rule of smallest sorrow It aims to minimise the maximal possible disadvantage
resulting from a false estimation of the environment This disadvantage can
be measured by the dierence between the gain expected from an action and the
maximal possible gain for a state It is also known as the opportunity cost because
it expresses the loss obtained due to a missed opportunity After computing the
disadvantage for each entry of the decision matrix we are able to predict the
maximal possible disadvantage for each action by looking for the maximum of
each row The action that minimises this value is selected by SavageNiehansrule
opportunity cost
z
 
z

z

z
 
z

z

max of row
a
 
  	 	   	 	
a

   	    	  
a

   	      
max of column  	 
The table above shows how the SavageNiehansrule works in the example The
maximum of each column shows the maximal possible utility for each state z
i

Each entry in the matrix is subtracted from its corresponding maximum which
results in the opportunity cost An entry providing the maximum of its column
of course has opportunity cost  because no opportunity was missed in this case
The maximal opportunity cost for each action should be minimised therefore
action a

providing the minimum  of all maximal possible disadvantages will
be selected
	
The LaplaceRule The Laplacerule assumes that there is basically no reason
to expect dierent probabilities for dierent environmental states ie it assumes
all possible states to be equally distributed Note that this is a kind of brute force
method to push a situation of uncertainty into a situation with risk as considered
in the previous section and that therefore it should only be applied to situations
where this basic assumption of the rules seems to be appropriate In fact the
Laplacerule suggests to assign a probability of occurrence to each state computed
as the reciprocal value of the number of dierent states and then to proceed like
Bayes rule would ie selecting the action with maximal expected utility In the
example this would result in selecting a

 P z
 
  P z

  P z

  
 


z
 
z

z

expected utility
a
 
  	 	
 		

  
a

   	

 	

  
 
a

   	 
  	


  
  Two Agents Decisions
  Game Theoretical Concepts
Game theory is a formal approach to the representation and formalisation of
decision situations that involve several acting agents From this point of view
it can be considered as a specic branch of decision theory and so the decision
theoretic concepts and methods also hold for the decision situations occuring in
game theory Additionally the interdependency of the decisions of the dierent
involved agents comes into play In the following paragraphs we will consider
the fundamental premises and assumptions of the theory and formally dene the
notion of a game in normal form We discuss the aspect of cooperation and
present some concepts of solutions for games
Premises and Goals
A major goal of game theory is the analysis of strategic decision situations involv
ing several interacting agents or players These situations will include cooperative
scenarios as well as conicting interests and thus competition To attain this
goal rst of all the theory has to provide appropriate formal descriptions of
games using mathematically valid objects and concepts Based upon this con
cepts like the solutions of a game can be dened For dierent classes of games it
should be proved that solutions exist and the qualities of these solutions should
be worked out and analysed Last but not least the theory has to be applied to


existing problems and it has to be shown that the methods provided to obtain
solutions are useful and adequate
As a presupposition for a formal denition of a game the premises of the situa
tions considered are given
  Several players interact by concurrently selecting one action from a set of
possible alternatives
  While each player has complete knowledge about the rules of the game
ie knows exactly in advance which combination of selections will lead to
which payo for each player he does not know any of the actual selections
of its opponents at the time taking its own decision All decisions are taken
independently of each others and simultaneously
  The payo gained by each player after all decisions have been implemented
does not solely depend on his own selection but on the combination of the
selections of all players
  Each agent is aware of these premises and takes them into consideration
while deciding And he knows that the other agents are doing this also
Although it is possible to perform several stages or rounds of selections as one
would usually expect by common sense in a game viewed as alternation of moves
and countermoves the scenario here is restricted to a single round of decisions
ie each agent has to decide only once for one action The reason for this
restriction is that game theory has succeeded in showing that any game involving
several consecutive decisions called a game in extensive form can be reduced to
a game in normal form without losing its crucial characteristics The normal
form of a game is a single round representation and will be dened formally in
the following section
Denition of a Game in Normal Form
A game #  N S u in normal form strategic form is dened by
  the set of players N  f      ng
  the strategy space which is a family S  fS
i
g
i N
of sets of strategies
Thereby S
i
 fs
i 
     s
im
g denotes the set of all strategies available for
player i The conjoint selection of a strategy of all players s  s
 
     s
n
 
Q
i N
S
i
is called a combination of strategies
	


For convenience we use s
i
to denote the strategy from S
i
selected by player i Furthermore
s
 i

 s
 
     s
i  
 s
i 
     s
n
  
Q
j i
S
j
is used to denote the combination of strategies
without the strategy s
i
of player i

  a payo function u 
Q
i N
S
i
 IR
n
that assigns a payo vector to each
combination of strategies us  p
 
     p
n
 Here p
i
denotes the payo
for the player i We will also use u
i
as a notation for the concatenation of
u and the projection to the ith component ie u
i
s  p
i

ConstantSum Games
A game is a constantsum game if there is a constant c such that for all
s 
Q
i N
S
i

P
n
i 
u
i
s  c
holds In the special case of c   we talk of a zerosum game In general
the structure of a game is not changed when a positive linear transformation is
applied to the payo function therefore the class of zerosum games captures
every situation that can be represented in a constantsum game This class is
useful to model conicting interests because the earnings of one player necessarily
correspond to the loss of another Especially in the case of n   this constraint
leaves no room for cooperation
Cooperative vs NonCooperative Games
A game is cooperative if it is possible for the players to make obligatory arrange
ments about their intended behaviour This condition includes
  the possibility of communication between the players prior to the decision
for an action
  an institution with the capability to enforce the commitments made or
punish the agents that do not hold their promises exogenous execution
The second point is much more important than the rst one because without
exogenous execution a communicated promise to select a specic action dierent
from that leading to an agents maximal payo is worthless as long as the other
agents cannot rely on its compliance There is also no chance for a revenge if one
agent does not stick to its promise because we are considering games in normal
form which means that only one round is played On the other hand a promise
to select that action that leads to the maximal payo is superuous because each
agent has the complete knowledge about the payo structure and thus can de
duce this information without such an announcement anyway Therefore games
without the feature of an exogenous execution are dened as noncooperative
games while scenarios incorporating this quality and providing channels for com
munication are considered to be cooperative games The case of exogenous
execution lacking any devices for communication can be neglected obviously

Note that this denition formally assigns the attributes cooperative and non
cooperative to games This does not mean that in a noncooperative game
cooperative behaviour of the players is impossible Cooperative behaviour will
occur if each agents decision logic enables it based on an incentive to select
the appropriate action even in a game that is noncooperative by denition
Nevertheless the prisoners dilemma introduced later in Section  provides
an example of a noncooperative game where cooperation for rational behaving
agents cannot occur even if they are able to communicate though the cooperative
behaviour would increase the payo for both players
Concepts of Solutions
The goal of dening solutions for a game is to provide rules and concepts for the
players to guide their decisions What is considered as a solution may depend
on the point of view A player will consider the combinations of strategies that
maximise its payo These however may not satisfy another player because the
payo may be small for them A global point of view may consider the set of
strategy combinations that maximise the sum of the payos of all players But
a single player not satised with its payo may take decisions that impede these
solutions to occur An appropriate concept of solution therefore must mark those
combinations that will occur if rational agents play the game One method to
obtain solutions is to exclude those combinations of strategies that will not occur
The following rules and concepts to characterise solutions have been proposed by
game theory
The Principle of Dominance This is a rule telling a rational player which
strategy not to select It is based on the observation that it is not rational to
select a strategy that leads to less payo than another one independently of the
strategies selected by the other players In short this rule can be postulated
as Do not select a strategy that is dominated by another strategy Formally
dominance is dened as follows
Denition Strategy s

i
 S
i
dominates strategy s
i
 S
i
if
  u
i
t
 
     s

i
     t
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  u
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t holds for all t 
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with t  t
 
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
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 s
i
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 
     k
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  u
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In the case that always  holds we say that s

i
strongly dominates s
i


The Maximin Principle This rule recommends to select a strategy as follows
For each strategy s
i
 S
i
consider the worstcase selection s
wc
i
of the other players
and the payo gained for that combination ie
p
wc
i
 min
s
 i
 
Q
j  i
S
j
u
i
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 
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  u
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Now select that strategy s
k
for which the worstcase payos obtain their maxi
mum which means
p
wc
k
 max
 jjS
i
j
p
wc
j
This principle determines the maximal payo that a player can obtain on its own
strength independent of what other players do ie even if the others behave
maximally unfavourable
The Nash Equilibrium To explain the idea of a Nash equilibrium we have
to introduce the strategy of the best answer or Bayes strategy It simply says
that if the decisions of the other players are known in advance it is easy for an
agent to determine its best answer ie the strategy that under this presupposition
maximises its payo Let s
i
be the combination of strategies of all players except
i then is best answer is to play a strategy s
b
i
that maximises its payo
u
i
s
 
     s
b
i
     s
n
  max
s
i
 S
i
u
i
s
 
     s
i
     s
n

In general there may be several best answers for each s
i
 The problem is that
usually the player does not know the other players decisions in advance However
in certain games it could be the case that there exists a combination of strategies
s

that mutually is a best answer strategy for each player
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In this case s

is called a Nash equilibrium point of the game A more intuitive
characterisation of an equilibrium point is that no player has an incentive to leave
the equilibrium as long as he assumes that no other player is going to leave it
If we assume that there is only one such point in a game then by using the
knowledge about the payo function and by reasoning about the other agents
reasoning each agent is able to deduce what the other agents rationally will
select namely the Nash equilibrium point In this case it is a good idea to dene
the equilibrium point as the solution of the game because it is the combination of
strategies that the agents as a matter of fact will select Unfortunately there are
several games with no or with several equilibrium points Furthermore though
the term mutually best answer might imply the assumption that the equilib
rium point is something desirable for the players this is denitively not the case
There are games where the equilibrium point in some sense is the worst selection
the agents can make cf Section  for an example

   TwoPerson ConstantSum Games
Denition   TwoPerson ConstantSum Game A twoperson constant
sum game is given by #  N S  S
 
 S

 u  u
 
 u

 where u
 
s
 
!u

s

  c
with s
 
 S
 
and s

 S

for a constant c ie
  the gain in utility of one player equals the loss in utility of the other player
the game is strictly competitive and it is not possible to play it cooperatively
  both players have diametrical interests
Thereby us
 i
 s
j
 species for each pair of actions s
 i
and s
j
the payo for
player   and player  In the payo matrix the sum of both elements of each pair
is c A constantsum game with c  
 is shown in the following payo matrix
player 
player   s
 
s

s
  

   
s
 
	    
Twoperson constantsum games model decision situations with a total clash in
the interests of the two agents Each constantsum game can be transformed into
a zerosum game ie c   with the same properties
To obtain this twoperson zerosum game u

! u
 
 c is transformed into u


c

!u
 

c

   to see that we just have to subtract
c

from each value to obtain
the payos of the equivalent zerosum game For the example given above this
results in the payo matrix
player 
player   s
 
s

s
  
    
s
 
  
If there is only a nite number of strategies for the players to choose from the
game is completely described by the payo matrix U  u
ij
 Therefore the
analysis of a game can be done on the basis of this matrix
Because the prot of one player in a constantsum game is the loss of the other
player it is assumed to be rational for a player to maximise his own payo and
therefore to minimise the payo of his opponent To reach this goal in a constant
sum game it is sucient to use the dominance and the maximin principle as a
decision criterion In the game shown above s

is a dominating strategy for player
 because he gets more utility when using this strategy than by using strategy
s
 
regardless which strategy is chosen by player       and    For
player   the dominance principle is not applicable    but     He can
 
use the minimax principle to choose strategy s
 
because this will guarantee him
a payo of at least  while strategy s
  
only guarantees a worstcase payo of  
The decision criterion best reply is also applicable Strategy s
 
is the best reply
of player   column to the strategy s

of player  row That player  will
choose strategy s

can be deduced by player   from the knowledge about the
payo matrix Assuming that player  acts rationally he must select s

because
of the dominance
In a twoperson constantsum game the power of a player  the payo he is able
to guarantee himself  is a good criterion to nd out what a player can gain from
a game In the example above strategy s
 
guarantees a payo of  for player  
whereas strategy s
  
only guarantees him a payo of  
  TwoPerson NonConstantSum Games
The twoperson nonconstantsum game is also called general twoperson game
and diers fundamentally from a constantsum game
  The prot of one player does not correspond to the loss of his opponent
ie the game is not strictly competitive the sums of the utilitypairs from
dierent matrix positions dier
  There is not a complete clash in the interests of the two players Because
of this both of them are able to prefer specic actions conjointly which
enables the possibility of cooperative solutions
In the sequel we present one of the most famous noncooperative twoperson non
constantsum games the prisoners dilemma In this example we will show that
strategies which are based on individual maximisation of utility dominance min
imax and Nash equilibrium will not always result in ecient solutions These
strategies will only provide suboptimal solutions Optimal solutions can only be
obtained by committing to a kind of collective rational behaviour
Prisoners Dilemma
This noncooperative game characterises the situations of two prisoners and was
rst described by Luce and Raia Luce  Raia 	
Two persons which are suspected to have committed a crime are trapped in solitary
connement The public prosecutor is convinced that both of them are guilty but
there is a lack of evidence to proof them to be guilty Both of the prisoners have
two possibilities to choose to confess or not to confess the crime If both of the
prisoners do not confess the crime the public prosecutor is only able to sentence
them for a minor crime and they will get a mild punishment If both of them
confess the crime both of them are accused of the crime but they will not get the
hardest punishment possible If only one of the prisoners confesses the crime

this prisoner will become the chief witness and will be set free shortly after the
court procedure is nished In this case the other prisoner will in this case get the
hardest punishment possible How should the prisoners behave in this situation
Formal Description of the Game in a Matrix Both prisoners players i
i  f  g have two strategies s
ij
j  f  g not to confess s
i 
 or to confess
s
i
 Depending on which of the strategies both of them will choose this results
in one of  	  possible combinations of strategies s  s
 j
 s
k
 which determine
the result es ie the number of years each of the prisoners will have to stay in
prison
The following matrix displays the situation in the prisoners dilemma
player  not confess confess
player   s
 
s

not confess   year for player     years for player  
s
  
  year for player   months for player 
confess  months for player    years for player  
s
 
  years for player   years for player 
The assessment of the results is now determined by the preferences of the players
Each player i assigns a utility u
i
es payo to each of the results es In this
example we can assume that the prisoners prefer a short punishment Therefore
using an ordinal utility function a large utility will be assigned to a short time in
prison
Derivation of a Payo Matrix from the Result Matrix Each combina
tion of strategies s leads to a specic result es Therefore each player i is able
to assign utility to s by using his utility function u
i
s In doing so the players
assign utility us  u
 
s u

s to each combination of strategies s and by this
the result matrix is transformed into a payo matrix The payo matrix is the
basis on which the players decide which strategy they should chose
Assuming that the prisoners have utility functions which assign more utility to
shorter periods in prison than to longer ones we get the payo matrix shown be
low for the Prisoners Dilemma The general prisoners dilemma is characterised
by the following structure
player  s
 
s

player   not confess confess
s
  
	 	 
 
not confess
s
 
 
  
confess

where the variables meet the constraints
  	    

A concrete instance of such a game is given by
player  s
 
s

player   not confess confess
player  
s
 
s

not confess confess
s
  

 
   
not confess
s
 
    
confess
Derivation of the Solution from the Analysis of the Payo Matrix
If player  chooses strategy s
 
 it is better for player   to confess the crime
ie chose strategy s
 
 But also if player  confesses the crime s
 
is the best
strategy for player   Analogously the same is true from the perspective of
player  Hence to confess is for both players a dominant strategy because
for both players i  f  g with j    i  u
i
s
i
 s
jk
  u
i
s
i 
 s
jk
 holds no
matter which strategy k is chosen by the opponent j Because of this it is for
both playersindependent form the action taken by the opponentindividually
rational to confess the crime The combination of strategies s
 
 s

 is a Nash
equilibrium point because none of the players have an incentive to switch to
another strategy None of the other strategy combinations have this property
of being in an equilibrium Nevertheless this combination is dominated by the
combination s
  
 s
 
 because with this combination both players obtain more
utility than in the equilibrium Even though both players should be interested in
changing their strategies and by doing so leaving the equilibrium the dominance
rule will prevent them from choosing another strategy than to confess
Analysis and Discussion The equilibrium point of the prisoners dilemma is
inecient because the players could get more utility 	 	 out of the situation if
they choose the cooperative combination of strategies s
  
 s
 
 instead of choos
ing the equilibrium combination of strategies s
 
 s

 The problem is that the
prisoners dilemma is a noncooperative game As discussed in section   a
noncooperative game is characterised by the lack of communication between the
agents to arrange mutual commitments andmuch more importantthe lack of
an exogenous institution to enforce the execution of the commitments In the
prisoners dilemma the possibility of communication would not help the prison
ers Just imagine that both prisoners have communicated and agreed in not

confessing whatever will be Now they are in the dock and the judge asks the
rst one of them Do you plead guilty Without an exogenous institution that
enforces the commitment he has no reason to assume that his buddy will stick
to the agreement He himself has promised not to confess but after answering
No to the judge his buddys decision is simply that between a big or a small
punishment So what should he answer Note that the assumption of simultane
ous independent decisions as it is presupposed in game theory in this case does
not matter at least not for the prisoner that is asked rst The characteristics
of his problem is not dierent from the case of two independent tribunals for the
prisoners in separate rooms
Let us now change the situation and assume the existence of an exogenous insti
tution able to enforce a commitment like in our example to force the prisoners
not to confess This can be modelled as a change of the payo matrix The
enforcement will rely on the threat of some kind of punishment

 The appraisal
of that punishment changes the agents utility Then the utility of a strategy
combination involving a decision contrary to the agreement no longer solely de
pends on the time staying in prison but also incorporates the punishment of the
enforcing institution In our example the external punishment should result in a
decrease of the utility of confessing so that  becomes smaller than 
 Then the
game is no longer a prisoners dilemma
Results The Prisoners Dilemma shows that
  decision rules which rely on the concept of individual rationality may lead
to inecient solutions In contrast to constantsum games nonconstant
sum games have properties which make the usefulness of these decision rules
doubtful
  an agreement such that a player is able to gain utility in violating the
agreement is meaningless as long as there is no exogenous institution with
the capability to enforce the execution of the agreement
Another Example The following payo matrix shows a game in which none of
the players strategies dominates the other one like it is the case in the prisoners
dilemma Furthermore it has two equilibrium points in s
 
 s
 
 and s
  
 s


because none of the players has an incentive to leave one of these points
Player 
Player   s
 
s

s
  
     
s
 
 		

Eg the promise of the Maa to kill every chief witness
	
If both players initially use the minimaxrule as their decision procedure this
results in the combination of strategies s
  
 s
 
 However both players have
an incentive to leave this point because each could receive the utility of  rather
than   by switching to the other strategy Note that only a single round of the
game is played if we talk of switching to the other strategy we really mean
changing the intention from selecting one strategy to selecting the other strategy
Therefore if player i thinks that the other one will denitively use the minimax
rule for his decision he could increase his expected utility by selecting strategy
s
i
 Assuming that the other players reasoning works the same way this results
in the combination s
 
 s

 which is rather bad for both players Therefore using
the minimaxrule seems to be a good advice But now the reasoning starts to
loop If the other player is convinced that the minimaxrule indeed is a good
advice then it is rational to switch etc We see that rational decisions are not
easy to take
Battle of the Sexes
Another prominent example for twoperson nonconstantsum games are games
of the type Battle of the Sexes which owe their name to the following description
of the situation in the game
A man and a woman fall in love and want to spend their sparetime together He
likes soccer games and she enjoys visiting the theatre but no one of them really
enjoys its favourite sparetime activity without the other They both want to be
together Of course he prefers to take her to a soccer game much more than to
accompany her to the theatre Her preferences are just the other way around
Games of this type have a payo matrix of the following kind
woman
man
s
 
s

soccer theatre
s
  
 	  
soccer
s
 
  	 
theatre
where   	  
It is easy to see that the man prefers the combination of strategies s
  
 s
 

whereas the woman prefers s
 
 s

 Both of these combinations of strategies
are in an equilibrium and therefore the problem to be solved by the players is to
agree on one of these equilibrium points
This setting can be found frequently in decision situations in business We have
one instance of such a situation if two companies try to set up a close cooperation


and for this reason have compiled two cooperation contracts out of which the
rst one is favourable for the rst company and the second one is favourable for
the second company If each company insists on its own contract they are not
able to nd an agreement
  Iterated Games
Up to this point we put the focus of the analysis on one shot games ie strategic
aspects which arise in repeated games have been omitted In contrast to one shot
games iterated games consist of a series of base game
Iterated games can be used to model evolutionary aspects see eg Axelrod 
The concept of evolutionary stable strategies ESS cf MaynardSmith  is
useful to explain the emergence of agent behaviour as for example in the case
of animals the institution of a dominance hierarchy the territorial and mating
behaviour or the behaviour in animal ghts cf Dawkins 

Of particular interest are twoperson nonconstantsum games In this case even
if they are noncooperative intelligent players will in a series of games agree in
silence on a combination of strategies that leads to a result which is for both
players benecial By choosing specic strategies a player is able to tell the
other player which of the combinations of strategies are preferred The iterated
prisoner	s dilemma is a good example for this
In the iterated prisoners dilemma it is clear that both players gain a substan
tial strategic option The players are able to take revenge for the actions of the
opponent which can be used to enforce cooperative behaviour and suppress non
cooperative behaviour Axelrod Axelrod  organised a tournament for com
puter programs in which computer programs using dierent strategies played
against each other an iterated prisoners dilemma game It turned out that a
strategy with the selfexplaining name titfortatie start with cooperation in
the rst game and then behave in the game at present in the same way as your
opponent did in the previous gameis the most ecient one However the anal
ysis of this situation shows that if there is only a sequence of nitely many games
then there is a large incentive for both players to cheat their opponent in the last
game because the opponent will not be able to take a revenge for the behaviour
in the last game Even worse If the number of iterations is known in advance
cheating in the last game will be deduced by both players and cheating in the
game next to the last becomes a matter of consideration By inductive arguments
the cooperative behaviour of the whole series of games may be spoiled
In iterated games it becomes evident that even in noncooperative games coop
eration can be enforced indirectly via the selected strategies in the series of the
game An exogamous enforcement by the punishment of noncooperative be
haviour via a third party is no longer necessary because each of the players is
able to take its own revenge

  Multiple Agents Decisions
In nperson games besides conict cooperation automatically plays a signicant
role Because there can be only two preference systems that are completely
conicting Therefore if n agents with n preference systems interact with each
other some subset of the set of players N will have interests in common which
possibly can be supported by cooperation Therefore nperson games are often
called coalition games If an agent has the option to join several coalitions he will
always join the one that oers him the highest increase in utility
  Coalitions in Cooperative NPerson Games
In   John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern dened in their book The
ory of Games and Economic Behaviour von Neumann  Morgenstern  the
nperson game for the rst time Their approach is based on the assumption that
players are able to communicate with each other and are therefore able to make
agreements and to form coalitions That is why their approach is excellently
suitable for analysing situations in which it is cooperated within groups
In a nperson game the players have the option to form coalitions such that
the utility the coalition receives possibly exceeds the sum of the utilities all the
members of the coalition could obtain individually based on their own strength
This is due to that
  the coalition has more resources than each of the individual players and
the coordinated application of these resources may lead to a more ecient
usage of resources than an application by individual single players guided
by their individual rationality
  the coalition may be able to provide incentives to the members to play
strategies that are not individually rational but substantially increase the
coalitions overall prot This is possible because the distribution of the
coalitions prot to its members is decoupled from the obtainment of the
prot
It is obvious that cooperative players will be better o than noncooperative
players because all results which are possible in the noncooperative case are still
possible in the cooperative case but not vice versa
Big eorts in theoretical investigations have been made to clarify the question how
coalitions should be formed among rational players and how a fair distribution of
the prot to the members of the coalition can be computed Shapley 	b The
main problem of cooperative game theory is to nd a distribution function for
the prot of the coalition which reects the dierent positions of the players eg
their power or strategic importance in the negotiation process when they build

the coalition

Closely related with the solution of the distribution problem is
the question about the rating of the potential power of coalition members

   Fundamental Concepts for the Analysis of NPerson
Games
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern von Neumann  Morgenstern 
introduced two basic concepts to be able to analyse the formation of coalitions
The denition of a game in characteristic form using a characteristic function to
dene the payo structure of the game and the characterisation of imputations
which are those distributions of the payo to the members of a coalition that
come into question to be solutions
The Characteristic Function
The formation of coalitions is such an important concept in nperson games that it
is straightforward to dene the payo structure of a game according to the prot
that the dierent possible coalitions are able to obtain Therefore a characteristic
function is used to dene the payo instead of the payo function known from
the game in normal form
Denition  Characteristic Form of a Game A nperson game #  
N  v in characteristic form is dened by the set of players N  f      ng
and the characteristic function v  
N
 IR which assigns a real value vK to
each K 
 N 
Thereby vK species the guaranteed utility the coalition K is able to obtain no
matter which strategies are chosen by the other coalitions Thus the characteris
tic function is based on the maximin principle and a transformation based on this
principle into the person normal form is possible where one player represents
K while the other player represents the complementary coalition N  K The
characteristic function has to full the condition v   and the condition of
superadditivity which will be explained in the following
An important notion for the analysis of game outcomes with respect to social
welfare sum of the agents payos is the notion of superadditivity
	
Normally it is assumed that the utility is paid to a player in units of an innitely divisible
transferable good eg money so that the prot of the coalition can be divided on its members
in any desirable way this is also called transferable utility


Voting games are a typical starting point for nperson game theory An example for this
is the problem of the formation of the government if none of the parties in the parliament has
an absolute majority and therefore a governmental coalition has to be formed In this case a
party with  seats may have the same power as a party with  seats Important is only that
the party joining the coalition will guarantee the absolute majority

Two disjoint coalitions K
 
and K

can independently from each other guarantee
themselves the utilities vK
 
 and vK

 If they cooperate by forming the bigger
coalition K
 
K

 they are almost

always able to get at least the utility vK
 
!
vK

 because they can simply simulate the behaviour of the coalitions K
 
and
K

 In some cases through cooperation they may even be able to nd better
strategies and to get even more utility
Denition  Superadditivity A game is called superadditive if the charac
teristic function v satises the following inequality K
 
K

 
N
with K
 
K

 
vK
 
 K

  vK
 
 ! vK


This means in superadditive games the utility several subsets of agents can realise
jointly by forming a coalition does never fall short of the sum of the utilities that
those agents can realise jointly by forming a coalition
Therefore in all superadditive games the agents can realise the highest social
welfare by forming the grand coalition K
g
 N consisting of all agents
Some nonsuperadditive games are subadditive
Denition  Subadditivity A game is called subadditive if the characteristic
function v satises the following inequality K
 
K

 
N
with K
 
 K

 
vK
 
 K

  vK
 
 ! vK


In subadditive games agents maximise social welfare by operating alone
There exist games that are neither superadditive nor subadditive In those games
the characteristic function v fulls gives us superadditivity for some coalitions
and subadditivity for others In such cases there is no general strategies for
maximising social welfare
Essential and Inessential Games
The only incentive for forming coalitions is to gain more utility than can be
obtained without forming the coalition Therefore only games in which there are
at least two disjoint subsets U and W of N such that
vU W  vU ! vW
holds are interesting These games are therefore called essential games because
at least the players from U and W are able to increase their utility by forming a

Except for the case where the coalition formation process involves costseg coordination
costs or payments for securing trust among the coalition membersthat exceed the value
additionally realisable by coalition formation

coalition All games without this condition lack any interesting aspects for coop
erative game theory and are called inessential
 

It can be shown that inessential
games can be characterised by a rather simple condition
#  N  v is inessential 
X
i N
vfig  vN 
It is easy to see that no constellation of coalitions can gain a higher utility than the
maximal coalition N  Therefore it is the most rational behaviour for all players
to cooperatively form the coalition N  But the problem that still remains is to
distribute the obtained prot vN  to the players       n In the next section
we see that a solution for this problem can only be provided by distributions of
the prot that satisfy some very intuitive conditions
  Solution Concepts for NPerson Games
In this section we present two solution concepts for npersongames the kernel
and the Shapley value Both concepts are applicable for games with a dened
characteristic function and propose as solutions payo vectors that satisfy certain
desired properties or specied axioms
  Von Neumann and Morgensterns Solution	 the
Kernel
The kernel deals with fairly distributing the utility vK 
P
i K
vi that could
be additionally realised by coalition formation
The kernel has some desired characteristics in that it gives symmetric players
equal payo and more desirable players more payo than to less desirable ones
Therefore it can be understood as a concept of fairness
Imputations and Kernel of a Game
Even the simple nperson games are fairly complex and it is usually not possible to
derive the best strategies or to predict the nal result of the game using a general
theory The problem of distributing the utility vN  to the players can be reduced
by excluding some possible distributions which are rather unacceptable for the
players because they contradict some basic assumptions that should be obeyed
by all rational solutions Two of these basic assumptions are the principles of
individual rationality and pareto optimality
 
Each twopersonconstantsum game is inessential because the minimal payo a player can
guarantee himself cannot be increased by cooperation An example for an essential game is the
prisoners dilemma because both player can benet form forming a coalition Zerosum games
with more than two players can be essential too
 
Informally the individual rationality guarantees for each player an incentive to
participate in the coalition implemented as gain in utility compared to the utility
he can achieve by his own strength The pareto optimality guarantees that the
utility vN  gained by the coalition N is expended entirely without saving any
rest More formally we can dene
Denition  Individual Rationality A payo
 vector u  u
 
 u

     u
n

 IR
n
is individually rational if and only if each of the players gets at least as
much utility as he could get on his own
i  N  u
i
 vfig
Denition 
 Pareto Optimality A payo
 vector u  u
 
 u

     u
n
  IR
n
is paretooptimal if and only if there exists no other payo
 vector u

which in
creases the payo
 for a player without decreasing the payo
 of any other player
 u

 u

 
 u


     u

n
  i  N  u

i
 u
i
 j  N  u

j
 u
j
Because
P
i N
u
i
 vN  must hold for every payo vector u the condition of
pareto optimality can also be expressed as
X
i N
u
i
 vN 
All payo vectors not obeying the principles of individual rationality and pareto
optimality should not be considered as solutions for the problem of distributing
vN  to the players Von Neumann and Morgenstern dened the set of allowed
payo vectors and called them imputations
Denition  Imputations The set of imputations for an nperson game #  
N  v is dened as
Iv  fu  IR
n
j u
i
 vfig 
X
i N
u
i
 vN g
To summarise this an imputation is a distribution of the overall payo vN 
gained by the maximal coalition N to the players which satises the criteria of
individual rationality and pareto optimality ie
  Each individual player receives at least as much payo as he is able to
obtain by his own strength
 All the prot gained by the coalition is entirely distributed to the players

Example A threeperson game with players A B and C is dened by the
characteristic function v with
vfAg  vfBg  vfCg  
vfABg  vfACg  
vfBCg  
vfABCg  
We see that no individual player can gain something All coalitions of
several players that have A as a member are able to gain a prot of  units of
utility
Rational players will only accept imputations as payo vectors But note that
not every imputation provides a reasonable solution In this threeperson game
 and 		 are imputations but an objective spectator would be aston
ished if one of them would be the result of the game This is due to the fact that
it is not evident why in both cases player A does not receive any prot although
a coalition without A does not get any utility
The example shows that though each reasonable solution must be an imputation
not all of the imputations provide a reasonable solution This should not be too
surprising because the principles of individual rationality and pareto optimality
only compare the behaviour of individuals ie oneperson coalitions to that of
the maximal coalition N  What is needed is a principle that extends individual
rationality to rationality of coalitions with more than one participant This is
provided by the denition of the kernel of a game
The Kernel of a Game
In natural extension of the principle of individual rationality it is rational for each
subset K  N of players to demand at least as much prot from the maximal
coalitionN as K could gain as an independent coalition by its own strength Only
imputations that respect this condition will be accepted by all possible coalitions
that potentially may be formed Therefore we dene
Denition  Kernel of a Game The kernel of #  N  v is the set of all
imputations u  Iv for which the condition of collective rationality holds
K  N 
X
i K
u
i
 vK
If a payo vector from the kernel of a game # is used to distribute vN  to the
players the game # is called stable because neither individual players nor subsets
of players have an incentive to form other coalitions than N  The stability of
coalition N is preserved Therefore the kernel of a game can be viewed as the
specication of the solution because it contains only payo vectors which full the

criteria of individual rationality and collective rationality of all possible coalitions
of players
Unfortunately the kernel is empty for many games
  
For this reason it is obvious
that the kernel of a game cannot be viewed as a general solution principle for
cooperative games
The solution of von Neumann and Morgenstern
Payo vectors from the kernel of a game provide solutions with satisfying proper
ties However a large number of games is not solvable with this approach because
their kernel is empty Von Neumann and Morgenstern wanted to be able to pro
vide a reasonable notion of solutions for all games and therefore introduced a new
concept for the solution of cooperative games which is based on the denition of
a dominance relation on the set of payo vectors
Denition  Dominance Relation In a game #  N  v an imputation
u  u
 
  u
n
 dominates an imputation w  w
 
  w
n
 if there exists a
nonempty coalition K 
 N such that the following conditions hold
 i  K  u
i
 w
i
 j  K  u
j
 w
j

P
i K
u
i
 vK
The rst condition species that there is at least one player in K who is better
o with the imputation u than with w while for all other members of K the
imputation u is not worse than w The second condition guarantees that the
players in K are really able to satisfy the payos specied by u
i
with the prot
vK the coalition is able to get
It is obvious that imputations in the kernel of a game cannot be dominated
by another imputation However this does not imply that an imputation in
the kernel of a game dominates each imputation which is not an element of the
kernel
 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern now dened L to be a solution of a cooperative
game if L satises the following two stability conditions
  No imputation of L dominates another imputation in the set L
 Each imputation which is not an element of L is dominated by at least one
imputation of L
Von Neumann and Morgenstern compare the set L with an accepted norm for
behaviour or with a social order The rst condition prevents internal contradic
tions and the second one takes care that behaviours which are not acceptable 
an imputation which is not in L viz  are eliminated
  
Eg this is the case for constantsum games ie vK  vN n K is constant for all K
 
It is also possible to dene the kernel of a game as the set of all imputations which are not
dominated by any other imputation

   Solutions for Games without Kernel
For games without kernel several concepts of solutions have been proposed
among others the Shapley Value Shapley 	b None of these solutions are stable
because if the kernel of a game is empty then there is at least one subset of players
which is not satised with the presented distribution because they would all to
gether get more utility if they form a coalition Nevertheless these solutions may
specify an equilibrium in the negotiation process which will be outlined further
in the sequel
The Shapley Value
The Shapley value is a solution concept Raia  that bases on an axiomatic
approach Rosenschein  Zlotkin c Rosenschein  Zlotkin b It is not a
model of stability in a bargaining process but more a basis of fairness for joint
win distribution
The Shapley Value species a formal solution for cooperative nperson games
which is based on the concept of the characteristic function
 
Central for Shap
leys approach is the specication of an index for the a priori power of a player
based on the increment of utility that a coalition can gain by including this player
as a new member
Shapley justies his method by specifying requirements which should be fullled
by solutions   IR
n
of a game #  N  v and proves that the Shapley Value as
dened below is the only payo vector which satises these requirements
 

    Iv
 if K  N  i  K  vK  fig  vK ! vfig holds
then 
i
 vfig
 if  is a solution of N  w then  !  is a solution of N  w ! v
 if   N  N is a permutation so that
K  N  vK  vK holds then i  N  
i
 
i
These requirements specify an unique payo vector whose elements represent the
agents Shapley values
The basic idea of the Shapley Value is based on the assumption that the great
coalitionN of the nperson game is formed step by step beginning with a coalition
which consists of one player and proceeding by adding one more player to this
coalition in every step For n players there are n$ dierent possible sequences
in which the players can join a great coalition Therefore all sequences are
 
Shapley adopts the assumption of super additivity and the transferability of utility from
the approach of von Neumann and Morgenstern
 
Therefore it is also possible to dene the Shapley Value based on these requirements
	
enumerated and the increment of utility the coalition gains by the admission of
a new player is ascribed to that player A players payo is then determined by
taking the average of all these assignments over all n$ possible sequences
Denition  	 Shapley Value In the nperson game #  N  v the Shapley
Value 
i
for each player i is dened by

i
 
X
KNnfig
jKj$jN j  jKj   $
jN j$
 vK  fig vK
In this formula the factor vKfigvK expresses the increment of utility the
coalition K gains by the admission of player i The left factor is explained by the
fact that there are jKj$ possible dierent sequences for the formation of coalition
K and furthermore jN j  jKj   $ possible dierent sequences to complete the
generation of N from K  fig The denominator is the number of all n$ possible
dierent sequences that are considered
The Shapley value apportions the prot of the coalition N to the n players
Players which on average contribute more to the utility of the coalition get more
utility out of the coalitions prot players which do not contribute to the prot
of any coalition do not get any utility
In the calculation of the Shapley value all possible ways of coalition accumulation
are taken into consideration An agents contribution to its coalition depends
on which other agents have joined before it and which ones will join after it
An agents Shapley value in a coalition equals the agents contribution to this
coalition averaged over all possible joining orders
The Shapley value does exist for all coalitions and is unique Additionally it is
guaranteed to satisfy individual rationality in superadditive games It satises
also the property of symmetry among agents and assigns more desirable agents
a higher utility than less desirable ones
Example Let us illustrate the computation of the Shapley value by reconsid
ering the example introduced above
vfAg  vfBg  vfCg  
vfABg  vfACg  
vfBCg  
vfABCg  
Obviously A has the power of veto because without him none of the oth
ers can enforce the decision Nonetheless A is not a dictator because he cannot
enforce the decision on his own The computation of the Shapley value is shown
in the following table


A B C C B A
B C A B A C
C A B A C B
A      
B      
C      
The rows show the six possible sequences in which the great coalition of  players
can be formed The contributions of the players are listed below In the sequence
ABC eg B contributes  to the coalition fABg because vfAg  
and vfABg   On the other hand C contributes nothing to the coalition
fABCg in this sequence because vfABg   and vfABCg  
Therefore the contributions of AB and C are given by  One can see
that the Shapley value for A is  and those for B and C are 	 As power of
veto enables him to get % of the money
Final Remarks
Kernel and Shapley value are only applicable in games with a dened character
istic function but not in games where the value of a coalition may depend on the
actions of nonmembers For the latter games that can be modelled as normal
form games the Nash equilibrium is applicable because it is a solution concept
in the space of strategies whereas kernel and Shapley value are solution concepts
in the space of payo congurations
One problem of the Nash equilibrium is that even in a Nash equilibrium subgroups
of agents could be motivated to deviate in a coordinated manner The concept of
strong Nash equilibrium Aumann 	 requires that there is no subgroup of players
that can increase the utilities of all its members by jointly deviating from their
Nash equilibrium strategies when all nonmembers keep their strategies xed
Therefore it guarantees more stability but is often too strong because in many
games no strong Nash equilibria do exist nonexistence problem

Chapter 
Game Theory in Multiagent
Systems
In this chapter we present an approach to utilise the results of game theory in
Multiagent Systems The negotiation between agents can be regarded as a game
according to the rules specied by the negotiation protocol
Rosenschein and Zlotkin Rosenschein  Zlotkin a provide a good foundation
for the analysis of real world multiagent applications In the following section we
present their categorisation of domains They classify the domains in a three&
level hierarchy Subsequently we address the possible forms of cooperation and
investigate the dierent possibilities for deception and incentive compatible ne
gotiation mechanisms to prevent it
 Denition of the Domains
The situation the agents nd themselves in is characterised by the general prop
erties of the domain and by the encounter the momentarily specication of the
goals they have to reach
 Task Oriented Domain
In a Task Oriented Domain TOD a number of agents have non&conicting jobs
tasks to do It can be possible to redistribute the tasks among the agents so
that the overall costs for the execution decreases This provides the opportunity
for cooperation by exchanging tasks among the agents
A TOD is dened by a set of possible tasks a set of agents and a monotonic cost
function which assigns to each subset of tasks the costs of executing them An
encounter is an assignment of tasks to agents
Denition    A Task Oriented Domain TOD is a tuple  T A c  where

 T is the set of all possible tasks
 A  fA
 
     A
n
g is an ordered list of agents
 c is a function c  
T
 IR

such that for each nite set of tasks X  T 
cX is the cost of executing all the tasks in X by any single agent c is
monotonic ie for any two nite subsets X  Y  T  cX  cY 
 c  
Denition   An encounter within a TOD  T A c  is an ordered list
T
 
 T

     T
n
 such that for all k  f     ng T
k
is a nite set of tasks from
T that A
k
needs to perform T
k
will also be called A
k
	s goal
We observe that every agent is able to perform any nite set of tasks with nite
costs and that there are no incompatible goals Therefore the agents have no
disadvantages from the existence of the other agents However they might prot
from cooperation by exchanging tasks in a way that reduces the costs for the
execution Besides no side eects occur in a TOD an agent cannot full another
agents goal by accident Hence explicit cooperation is necessary to benet from
the other agents
Although the denition of the TODs is quite restrictive it includes some classical
multiagent domains like the postmen domain which will serve as a simple ex
ample later Furthermore the concept of TOD is useful for analysing simplied
versions of realworld applications
 
 Beyond that it is reasonable to rene the
denition and to introduce a hierarchy of more specic TODs
Denition   A TOD  T A c  is called subadditive if for all nite X Y 

T  we have cX  Y   cX ! cY 
In a subadditive domain the costs of performing two sets of tasks together is never
higher than the costs of performing them separately To bunch tasks is often a
good idea in subadditive TODs
Denition   A TOD  T A c  is called concave if for all nite sets of
tasks X 
 Y Z 
 T  we have cY  Z cY   cX  Z cX
In a concave TOD the costs that an arbitrary set of tasks Z adds to a set Y
cannot exceed the costs that Z adds to any subset X  Y 
Denition   A TOD  T A c  is called modular if for all nite sets of
tasks X Y 
 T  we have cX  Y   cX ! cY  cX  Y 
 
With some modication of the denition we can even gather the shipping domain see
Section 

Modular Domains are the most restricted TODs The costs of combining two
sets of tasks is exactly the sum of the costs of the sets minus the costs of their
intersection
It is easy to see that concave TODs are subadditive and modular TODs are
concave
  State Oriented Domain
In State Oriented Domains SODs which are more general than TODs the goals
of the agents are not to execute independent tasks but to move the world into
certain states The negotiation objects in SODs are the agreements on a common
goal state and the development of joint plans to reach that state
In the SODs the environment is characterised by a set of states a set of agents
a set of possible joint plans and a cost function which assigns for every plan the
costs of each agents role to that agent An encounter in a SOD is an assignment
of a set of goal states to each agent
Denition  
 A State Oriented Domain SOD is a tuple  SAJ  c  where
 S is the set of all possible world states
 A  fA
 
     A
n
g is an ordered list of agents
 J is the set of all possible joint plans A joint plan J  J moves the world
from one state in S to another The actions taken by agent k are called k	s
role in J and will be referred to as J
k

 c is a function c  J  IR


n
 For each joint plan J  J  cJ is a vector
of n positive real numbers the cost of each agent	s role in the joint plan If
an agent plays no role in J  his cost is 
Denition   An encounter within a SOD  SAJ  c  is a tuple
 s G
 
 G

     G
n
  such that s  S is the initial state of the world and for
all k  f     ng G
k
is the set of all acceptable nal world states from S for agent
A
k
 G
k
will also be called A
k
	s goal
In a SOD the agents goals are to move the environment into certain goal states
A goal can either be achieved or not it cannot be partially achieved Hence
a conict between the agents is possible if the intersection of their goal states
is empty or very expensive to reach However if there is a common goal state
the agents might benet from each other in reaching it by cooperating and thus
lowering the costs
In contrast to the TODs in a SOD actions have side eects An agent performing
an action might hinder or help another agent without knowing For example an
agent can accidently achieve the goal of another while working on its own goal
The blocksworld is a wellknown example for a SOD
	
description cooperation properties
TOD independent goals increase of performance
no conicts by redistribution of tasks
SOD goal is set of states cooperation
conicts possible conict solving
WOD worth instead of cooperation
goal states conict solving
Figure   Summary of the Domains
 Worth Oriented Domain
The denition of a Worth Oriented Domain WOD equals that of a State Ori
ented Domain Yet an encounter is dened in a dierent way
Denition   An encounter within a WOD  SAJ  c  is a tuple
 s W
 
W

    W
n
  such that s  S is the initial state of the world and
for all k  f     ngW
k
 S  IR

is the worth function of agent k W
k
assigns
some value to each possible nal state in the world W
k
will also be called A
k
	s
goal
Like the SODs the WODs are characterised by a set of states some of which are
xed goal states But in contrast to the goal states in SODs there is assigned
worth to the states such that some states are more desirable to reach than others
By assigning worth to the states it becomes possible to achieve goals partially or
split them into subgoals which when achieved give the agent already some utility
This makes further cooperation possible as it allows the agents to compromise
Like in SODs the objects of negotiation in WODs are joint plans but the agree
ment on a goal state is more complex because it is possible for the agents to make
concessions by relaxing their goals
Table   summarises the properties of the three types of domains and describes
the dierences between them
  Cooperation and Deception
There are several situations in which an agent might be tempted to take advan
tage of the other agents cooperativeness If every agent tries to do so what
might unfortunately be individually rational the overall solution will be bad
the tragedy of the commons Because of the dierent characteristics of the
domains dierent forms of deception may be protable
Before we turn to deception we should dene what we regard as a fair outcome of
a negotiation In the next paragraphs we will dene the term negotiation mecha
nism list the criteria Nash introduced to describe a fair negotiation mechanism
	 
give some examples of cooperation in the domains classied above and explain
how deception can be prevented by choosing appropriate mechanisms
  Negotiation Set
 Protocols and Strategies
A negotiation mechanism is dened by a set of possible deals a negotiation pro
tocol and a negotiation strategy The negotiation set is the set of possible deals
which the negotiation might concern For example in a TOD the set of pure
deals is the set of all possible redistributions of the tasks among the agents A
mixed deal is a partitioning of the tasks but instead of explicitly assigning the
partitions to the involved agents they agree on performing a lottery with a certain
probability to determine who is going to perform which part of the tasks An
AllorNothing deal is a mixed deal where one of the agents will perform all the
tasks The negotiation over mixed deals allows the agents to agree on solutions
which are globally better because the sum of the agents costs is lower than in
any pure deal However they are not individually rational as single agents have
more work to do than they would if they were alone Besides creating more
utility the use of mixed deals and allornothing deals can prevent deception in
certain TODs
The negotiation protocol species the rules of interaction which control the pro
cess of nding an agreement Finally the negotiation strategy of a single agent
determines the behaviour of that agent according to the liberties the protocol
leaves
Domain attributes aect the properties of the negotiation mechanism A protocol
that motivates agents to act in an intended way in one type of domain can
generate unintended behaviour in a domain of a dierent type
The concept of the Nash equilibria from game theory can easily be adopted to
negotiation strategies A pair of negotiation strategies s
 
and s

is said to be in
Nash equilibrium if s
 
is the best answer to s

and vice versa A strategy is in
symmetric Nash equilibrium if it is the best answer to itself
   Nashs Criteria for a Fair Negotiation Mechanism
Nash dened a fair negotiation mechanism by claiming a list of properties for
the outcome of the mechanism Nash 	
  Individual rationality every participant gets at least the utility he would
have got without the agreement
  Pareto optimality it is not possible to change the agreement so that a
participant gets more utility without lessening the utility of the others
  Symmetry if the situation is symmetric the solution should be symmetric
as well that means both agents should obtain the same expected utility
	
  Invariance with respect to linear utility transformations If the utility mea
sure of one or more agents is changed by the application of linear functions
it should not inuence the outcome of the negotiation process
  Independence of irrelevant alternatives The elimination of deals which are
not chosen as solutions does not aect the outcome of the negotiation pro
cess
Nash showed that the only mechanisms that satisfy the above criteria are the
product maximising mechanisms PMM The protocol of a PMM is symmetri
cally distributed and the strategy is in symmetric Nash equilibrium Two agents
using a PMM will agree on a deal that maximises the product of their utili
ties If there are several product&maximising deals the mechanism will choose
the one that maximises the sum of the utilities If there is more than one deal
that maximises the sum and the product of the utilities the mechanism will
choose randomly These requirements can be used to construct a simple PMM
straightforwardly
Example Both agents propose a single deal from the negotiation set From
these deals the one with the higher product of utilities will be chosen if both
deals oer the same utility product then the deal with the higher sum of utilities
will be chosen in case that both deals also oer the same sum a coin toss selects
the outcome The best strategy for an agent using this protocol is to compute
the set of product and sum maximising deals and propose the one that gives him
the highest utility
  Deception in Task Oriented Domains
The potential for cooperation in TODs is to save costs by exchanging tasks
Therefore unfair agents will try to manipulate the negotiation to reach a better
distribution of the tasks There are few possibilities to cheat on a product max
imising mechanism any behaviour that violates the rules of the protocol will be
detected by the others and can cause them to break o the negotiation further
more no aberration from the supposed strategy can be benecial because the
strategy is in symmetric Nash equilibrium Hence the only way to manipulate
the outcome of a product maximising mechanism in a TOD is to be untruthful
about the initial distribution of the tasks

 Actually the possibilities of lying
in a TOD are restricted to hiding tasks and inventing new tasks An invented
task is called decoy task if it is possible for the liar to produce this task if it
is scheduled to another agent A task which cannot be produced on demand is
called phantom task A decoy task is always save while a phantom task might
be detected In this case a penalty mechanism should serve to prevent lying

Which is possible only if the agents have incomplete information about the goals of the
others what seems to be a realistic assumption
	
General
Hidden Phantom Decoy
Pure L L L
Mixed L T%P L
Subadditive
Hidden Phantom Decoy
Pure L L L
Mixed L T%P L
AllorNothing T T%P L
Concave
Hidden Phantom Decoy
Pure L L L
Mixed L T T
AllorNothing T T T
Modular
Hidden Phantom Decoy
Pure L T T
Mixed L T T
AllorNothing T T T
Figure  Matrix of Incentive Compatibility
In Rosenschein  Zlotkin a Rosenschein and Zlotkin analyse in detail which
types of deception can be benecial in dierent TODs Figure  summarises
the results The table entry L means that there exist negotiation situations such
that lying is benecial eg in a negotiation over pure deals in a general TOD
decoy lies may be benecial The entry TP means that there is the danger
of phantom lies being discovered So if it is possible to penalise lying agents it
becomes the dominant strategy to tell the truth T means that telling the truth
is always the best strategy
  Cooperation and Deception in SODs and WODs
In State and Worth Oriented Domains the agents operate in a common environ
ment Therefore they have to agree on a goal state they want to reach and on a
joint plan to reach that state
In SODs there is a clear distinction between goal and nongoal states that allows
to specify the following four situations
  The situation is called symmetric cooperative if there exists a common goal
state and a joint plan to reach it which costs both agents less or equal than
	
it would cost them to achieve their goal on their own In this case both
agents appreciate the presence of the other
  The situation is called symmetric compromise if there exists a common goal
state but the costs of jointly reaching it are for both agents higher than the
costs of reaching their goals on their own In this case both agents would
prefer to be alone in the world
  If there exists a common goal state and the costs of reaching it are for one
agent higher and for the other lower than the costs of reaching their goals
alone the situation is called nonsymmetric cooperativecompromise
  If the intersection of the agents goal states is empty we speak of a conict
situation
In the cooperative and compromise situations rational agents will agree to per
form a plan that changes the world state into a common goal state The utility of
the agents depends on the costs of the role they are playing in the joint plan A
product maximising mechanism can lead to a fair allocation As in TODs mixed
deals may increase the expected utility for both agents in this case as well
There are three ways to deal cooperatively with conict situations of which the
simplest is to toss a coin to decide who may reach his goal Although one of the
agents will not get any utility in the end the expected utility before the tossing
of the coin is positive for both agents The probability of the outcome of the coin
may be due to negotiation There are some domains eg the blocksworld where
two agents can reach a goal at lower joint cost than a single agent In that case it
is possible to increase the expected utility of the agents using SemiCooperative
Deals or MultiPlan Deals In a semicooperative deal the agents agree to save
costs by cooperatively reaching an intermediate state from which both agents
goal states are reachable and then tossing a coin to decide who may carry on to
reach his own goal state A multiplan deal involves cooperation after the coin is
tossed For each agents goal a joint plan is generated and a probability for the
tossing of the coin is negotiated Then the coin is tossed and the looser has to
help the winner to reach his goal This conict solving strategy certainly requires
the assuredness that agents keep their commitments after they lost the gamble
Since in a WOD there is worth assigned to the goal states and therefore it is
possible to relax goals it is not straightforward anymore to choose that common
goal state that is reachable with minimal costs Instead the agents have the
problem of nding a goal state with maximal utility namely with the highest
dierence between worth and costs of reaching it Additionally the existence of
a joint plan that achieves a fair product maximising distribution of the utility
is necessary If the agents have the computational power to nd such a state and
plan a PMM will lead to an optimal and fair outcome of the negotiation
		
Like in TODs in SODs and WODs the agents have the chance to manipulate
the outcome of the negotiation process in their favour by taking advantage of the
other agents incomplete information and lying about their set of goal states and
in WODs about their worth function In expanding or altering their actual goal
they can pretend that it would be much easier for them to reach their goal alone
or that they obtain lesser utility from the joint plan and so they can justify to
do lesser work in the joint plan
Like in the cooperative and compromise situation there is some chance for decep
tion in the conict situation as well By lying that his own goal is easier to reach
a single agent can pretend that he has less utility from the joint plan than his
opponent hence he will have to play a less expensive role in the semicooperative
joint plan or his chances in the gamble will increase
Unfortunately there is no general mechanism to prevent lying in a domain with
incomplete information If one agent has more information at his disposal than
the others he might be able to invent a benecial lie If it is not possible to detect
the lie it is save A reasonable way to cut down deception in such domains may
be to communicate the relevant information simultaneously such that none of the
agents obtains a protrusion of information
	

Chapter 
Coordination Mechanism Design
Coordination the process by which an agent reasons about its local ac
tions and the anticipated actions of others to try and ensure the com
munity acts in a coherent manner is perhaps the key problem of the
discipline of Distributed Articial Intelligence N R Jennings in
Jennings  p 
Coordination mechanisms for multiagent systems are often chosen without ex
plaining the reasons why precisely these mechanisms were selected Certainly
in some domains with special types of environments and agent behaviours they
work ne But what happens if some assumptions change that are necessary for
the intended performance of the mechanism
How can we build up a coordination mechanism for a domain with known domain
attributes in order to obtain a coordination
 
of the agents that meets some
desired criteria A promising approach for answering this question provides the
economic theory of mechanism design that uses the tools of economics and game
theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will yield
some desired outcome
This is a normative approach whose goal it is to generate protocols so that when
agents use them according to some stability solution concept eg dominant
strategies or Nash equilibrium desirable social outcomes follow
Outlook on this Chapter
In the rst section of this chapter we will provide a brief overview on the research
area of coordination mechanism design Application areas are the contract theory
the theory of collective decision making and allocation problems in general
After that in the remaining sections of this chapter a detailed and comprehensive
overview of available auction mechanisms as special forms of coordination mech
anisms is given This is done with the pretension to identify incentivecompatible
 
In this context by coordination we mean the assignment of items or tasks to agents The
overall goal is to achieve an ecient allocation
	
auctionbased coordination mechanisms which are truthrevealing Thus they
guarantee ecient allocation decisions even under incomplete information about
the agents private valuations or preferences Both a specication of their con
stituent rules and their impacts on the strategy selections of participating agents
is presented in detail
 Economic Theory of Mechanism Design
An Allocation Problem under Incomplete Information
Assume you adopt the role of a planner who has to determine an allocation of a
set of items to a set of individuals Thereby both the procedure or mechanism you
use and the resulting allocation have to meet some desired eciency criteria If
you are interested in obtaining an economically ecient allocation your objective
is to award each item to the individual who values it most To accomplish this
you need informations about the individuals private valuations or preferences
But assume you are in a decision situation with incomplete information that is
the individuals are autonomous and you do not have perfect knowledge about
their private preferences The problem you are then faced with is the following
You need to ask the individuals for their preferences but you cannot rely upon
that they truthfully reveal their private informations to you when they are self
interested


This would cause no problems for the planner if he

could use interaction rules
under which consumers would truthfully reveal how much an item is worth to
them thus providing the means for the ecient provision to be made The
identication of such interaction rules is wellknown as the problem of mechanism
design for the ecient assignment of goods or in short as the assignment problem
It constitutes a central research objective of the economic theory of mechanism
design
 The Assignment Problem
The assignment problem Olson  Porter  is one of nding a way of e
ciently assigningm discrete items to n people when their preferences are unknown
to the person or mechanism making the assignment
Consider the problem of assigning m elements of a set M of items or slots to
n elements of a set of agents N such that the total system welfare is maximised
An outcome or assignment x  A is an nm matrix where x
ij
   if agent i is
assigned item j and x
ij
  if he is not

Ie each individual acts only for its own benet

We refer to an articial agent with it and to an agent that could be both human or
articial with he or she
	
The preferences of each agent depend upon the item allocated any monetary
payment and the agents type The type 
i
of an Agent i parameterises the
individual values that i places on the goods being allocated Each 
i
is an element
of the set of all possible types '
i
that an agent i may adopt The entirety of
all the agents types   
 
  
n
 is called prole Each agent i calculates
his valuation for an assignment x  A whereby A is the set of all allocations
through an evaluation function vx 
i
  
P
j

i
j
x
ij
 For simplicity we will use
v
i
x instead of vx 
i

e assume that the utility of agent i is quasilinear

and is given by ux t 
i
  
u
i
x t  v
i
x ! t
i
 where t
i
is any monetary transfer to or from agent i
The assignment problem A can be mathematically described as a maximisation
problem in which
max
x A
W  
P
i N
P
j M

i
j
x
ij
is to be determined with respect to the following set of constraints
P
j M
x
ij
   i  N
P
i N
x
ij
   j M
x
ij
    i  N j M
If an allocation solves A then it is said to be outcome ecient W is called the
total or social welfare of the system
It is important to point out that the planners aim is to bring about an allocation
that meets some desired eciency criteria The planners objectives are thereby
specied by an allocation rule Groh 
 that denes the planners desired target
allocations for a given 
Denition   Allocation Rule An allocation rule is a function
f  '
 
    '
n
 A
that species for each possible prole  of agent types 
i
a nonempty set of desired
allocations f  A
In principle thereby the planner strives after an assignment of allocations to
the true types of the individual agents Because incorrect information about the
agents types generally results in an undesired outcome of the planners allocation
procedure That means a loss of global utility compared to the allocation that
would result if the individuals revealed their private preferences or valuations
truthfully
The planner can try to solve this problem through decentralisation by construct
ing a mechanism Dasgupta et al  Groh 
 also called coordination mecha
nism

In quasilinear environments the utility an agent gets from any assignment does not depend
on the amount of utility he already possesses
	
Denition 	 Mechanism A mechanism mech provides each agent i for
i     n with a nite set S
i
of signals or strategies s
i
 whereby s
i
 S
i
i
and s  s
 
  s
n
 The mechanism denes an allocation  A by the function
mech  S
 
     S
n
 A s  mechs x
Consequently a mechanism can be interpreted as a set of rules that determine
the permissible interactions of the participating agents The agents are asked
to send free signals or strategies to the planner that imply a certain allocation
to them Thereby the individuals know the mechanism the planner uses A
mechanism may thoroughly consist of a complex dynamic procedure In this case
the strategy sets S
i
would consist of plans of actions that inform each agent at
each stage of the mechanism what strategies are possible
With a direct mechanism Groh 
 individuals simultaneously and at once
reportinstead of any number of signalsonly one single information namely
about their type
(

i
 '
i
 as signal s
i
 S
i
to the planner An individuals type
comprises all its private information However
(

i
 
i
must not necessarily hold
ie the reported information about the type has not necessarily to be true De
pending on the type of the allocation problem this may be its private valuation
for a single item or a vector of valuations for multiple items
Denition   Direct Mechanism A mechanism mech
D
is called a direct
mechanism if S
i
 '
i
i
Denition  Indirect Mechanism Mechanisms with S
i
 '
i
are called
indirect mechanisms
As mentioned above the agents know both the mechanism mech which forms
the basis for the determination of the resulting allocation and their individual
utility function u
i
 which makes it possible for them to assess their utility loss or
win u
i
x t resulting from each possible allocation x  A
On that basis they will deduce their individual strategies by using a game
theoretical solution concept and nally play strategies in the mechanism mech
that are equilibrium strategies s
i
and result in an equilibrium point s

 
s
 
  s
n
 The set of all equilibrium strategies in a mechanism mech is de
noted by E
mech

An intuitive characterisation of an equilibrium is that no player has an incentive to
deviate from his equilibrium strategy and therefore does not leave the equilibrium
as long as he assumes that no other player is going to leave it see the Nash
equilibrium concept for instance
If a planner strives after coordinating selfinterested individuals such that the
coordination process results in an allocation promoted by its objective function
or allocation rule f the crucial question the planner is faced with is


Is it at all feasible to design a coordination mechanism mech that induces the
participating agents with prole  to play strategies or to send signals s
i
such
that mechsf
In answering this question the revelation principle see the next section plays a
fundamental role In the following we want to introduce some concepts needed
to be able to understand precisely its motivation and statement
Denition  A mechanism mech implements the allocation rule f completely
if   ' the following holds
mechE
mech
D
  f
Such a mechanism would generate allocations for the individual agents that co
incide with the desired allocations for their true types specied by the allocation
rule
Denition  A direct mechanism mech
D
implements the allocation rule f
truthfully if   ' the following holds
  E
mech
D
 and mech
D
  f
Denition  Dominant Strategy A strategy s
i
 S
i
is a dominant strat
egy for an agent i characterised by his type  if and only if (s
i
 S
i
and  s
i

S
i
 S
 
     S
i 
 S
i 
     S
n
the following holds
u
i
mechs
i
 s
i
 t  u
i
mech(s
i
 s
i
 t
De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The inequality statement above is called incentive compatibility constraint
Denition  IncentiveCompatible Mechanism A mechanism that im
plements an allocation rule f truthfully in dominant strategies is called incentive
compatible

mechE
mech
 
 f for complete implementation

 
An incentivecompatible mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for the agents
to report or reveal their information truthfully Therefore such mechanisms are
often called truthrevealing
Denition  Direct Revelation Mechanism A direct incentive
compatible mechanism m
D
is also called a direct revelation mechanism
It is clear that an incentivecompatible coordination mechanism cannot coincide
with the interests of all of the individuals for some of them lying could be ben
ecial in another mechanism Now we are prepared to formulate the revelation
principle
  The Revelation Principle
The revelation principle Myerson   Emons  Varian 	 Ma et al  makes
a fundamental statement about which allocation rules can be implemented and
therefore which desired outcomes can be achieved under incomplete information
ie when information is decentralised among several agents
Theorem   Revelation Principle If there exists a mechanism mech that
implements f in dominant strategies then there exists an equivalent direct mech
anism mech
D
that implements f truthfully in dominant strategies Groh 
Consequently the revelation principle says that for any however complex mecha
nism resulting in some equilibrium outcome with a corresponding allocation there
exists an equivalent direct revelation mechanism that yields the same equilibrium
outcome Emons  or allocation


That is loosely speaking    whatever can be done with any mechanism can
also be done with a direct revelation mechanismWinand Emons in Emons 
p Negatively formulated this yields the following impossibility result that
answers our crucial question stated above
If there is no mechanism in the class of direct revelation mechanisms that
implements the allocation function f and results in allocations fthen it
is not at all feasible to design such a coordination mechanism because there is
no such mechanism in the class of all mechanisms
So the revelation principle tells us that despite the existence of a multi
tude of conceivable however complex coordination mechanisms a planner who
strives after implementing a desired allocation function can restrict himself to
search in the class of direct revelation mechanisms without loss of generality
Martimort  Stole 

For a proof of the revelation principle see Groh 


The Vickrey Principle
An example for such a direct revelation mechanism is the Vickrey Auction VA
presented later in this chapter The VA bases on the Vickrey principle or Vickrey
pricing rule
Denition 	 Vickrey Principle The Vickrey principle lays down that
  if an item is auctionedo
 then the agent who places the highest bid for
an item is awarded the item But he is only charged a price equal to the
secondhighest bid
  if an agent o
ers his service for performing an order and claims a certain
payment for it then the agent with the lowest claimed payment is awarded
the order But he receives a payment equal to the secondlowest o
er
In so far the Vickrey principle couples o the valuation an agent states for an
item from the price he is nally charged if he wins it Therefore the bid or
message sent to the auctioneer is in fact the entire private information of the
agent his utility function
Certainly other indirect mechanisms like negotiations and bargaining would be
applicable But the revelation principle Myerson   states that    anything
that can be achieved by such an indirect mechanism can be achieved by a direct
mechanismVarian 	
Incentive Contracting
Let us assume that individuals act in a noncollaborative environment They
have to perform some tasks and they possess and desire several items that they
require for fullling their goals When we consider realworld situations where
individuals may benet from contracting out some of their tasks to other agents
or from selling purchasing items to from other agents we need to implement
a monetary system for the provision of rewards into our coordination mechanism
that guarantees an ecient allocation of items and tasks to the individuals
In this case a mechanism is not only faced with the problem of nding an ecient
allocation but also of settling prices that gives the individuals an incentive to take
part in it and thereby to reveal their true valuations This problem is well known
as the problem of incentive contracting
An approach for solving this problem consists in using incentivecompatible
auctionbased mechanisms for allocation and price settlement In the following
sections mechanisms are discussed by which items can be auctioned o


  Classifying AuctionBased Mechanisms
Auction mechanisms can be used in two auction situations
In the classical auction situation an auctioneer trieson behalf of a sellerto sell
an item to a set of bidding agents and wants to get the highest possible payment
The bidding agents in contrast have exactly orthogonal interests Namely they
strive to acquire the item at the lowest possible price
Besides this classical situation also the contracting situation has to be mentioned
in which an auctioneer wants to subcontract out tasks at the lowest possible price
while the agents competing for the assignment of those tasks strive to acquire
the highest possible payment for their task performing activities
In both situations the presented mechanisms work analogously and generally
lead to a binding contract among two agents namely the winning agent and the
auctioneer
SingleItem Auctions
A singleitem auction or single auction is an auction where only one single item
is sold
There exist four classical auction mechanisms for auctioningo a single item that
are fundamental for the design and understanding of all other auction mecha
nisms Those classical singleitem auction mechanisms split up in two progressive
and two oneshot sealedbid auction procedures
  progressive variants
 English Auction EA
 Dutch Auction DA
  oneshot sealedbid variants
 FirstPrice SealedBid Auction FPA
 SecondPrice SealedBid Auction also called Vickrey Auction VA
Further variations on singleitem auctions are
 the EscalatingBid Auction EBA and
 the DemangeGaleSotomayor Auction DGS
MultipleItem Auctions
Multiple ie m   items can be sold by successively carrying out a sequence
of m progressive singleitem auctions If the items are to be sold or allocated
simultaneously multipleitem auctions are used Multipleitem auction variants
are


  the Matrix Auction for Identical Items MIA
  the Matrix Auction for Heterogeneous Items MHA
  the DemangeGaleSotomayor Auction DGS
  the Generalised Vickrey Auction GVA
  the monetary VickreyLeonard Auction VLA and
  the VickreyLeonard Chit Auction VLC
Progressive Auctions
In progressive auctions bids or prices are lowered or raised incrementally until
the most suitable bidder for receiving the items can be selected Progressive
auctions can be simultaneous or successive In simultaneous progressive auctions
bidders are asked to put up their bids simultaneously
SealedBid Auctions
These auctions are preferable when an auction is distributed over space and%or
time and when communication cost are high Each bidder submits a sealed bid
The bids are opened and the item is awarded to the most suitable agent generally
the one with the highest bid Normally the bids are obligatory and therefore
cannot be progressively increased or decreased once they have been made
Overall View
Table   gives an overall view of how auction mechanisms can be classied
according to the number and disparity of the items that have to be allocated
and the bidding rules that are used
Depending on how the agents assign values monetary equivalent to utility to an
item a further renement of auction mechanisms is possible One can distinguish
three dierent value assignment settings in auctions that have a crucial impact on
the individual strategies of each agent because an agents strategy is a function
of both the individual value he assigns to an item and prior beliefs about the
valuations of other agents
Private Value Auctions
In privatevalue auctions an agents marginal cost%valuation for a task%item
is totally determined locally and independent of other agents marginal
cost%valuations
These auction settings occur whenever a winning agent will not resell the item
awarded to him but uses it for his own purposes

	
SingleItem Auctions MultipleItem Auctions
Identical Heterogeneous
Items Items
Progressive EA DA DGS DGS DGS
Mixed EBA
OneShot VA FPA MIA MHA
SealedBid MEVA VLA VLC GVA
Table   The classication of auction mechanisms
Public Value Auctions
The opposite to private value auctions are publicvalue auctions in which an
agents valuation

cost for an item task is entirely determined by other agents
valuations
Common Value Auctions
In common value auctions an agents valuation depends also entirely on the val
uations of other agents but here the value of the item is the same for all bidding
agents
Correlated value Auctions
Here the value an agent assigns to an item depends partly on its individual local
preferences and partly on the values of other agents As a result these auction
settings occur whenever a winning agent has the possibility to resell the item
awarded to him to other agents
For example in contracting settings this is the case when tasks can be subcon
tracted An agent canbased on his local task performing capabilitiesaccept
the order to perform a task for a specied payment but recontract out this task
if he nds another agent that performs the task at lower cost for instance In
this case the cost of the rst agent depend solely on the cost of the latter
	
The valuation of an agent is equivalent to his expected utility



 Simple Auction Mechanisms
The following auction types are very prominent Whenever the term auction is
used you normally think of the English auction EA Since it is the bestknown
one because the EA is generally used when valuablenesses are auctioned o for
instance in the worlds most famous auction houses Sothebys and Christies
Tulips in Holland are auctioned o according to the rules of the Dutch auction
and rstprice sealed bid auctions are used in public invitations to bid We
call these three auction mechanisms simple because the way they settle prices
for awarded items is very simple There is only one winner who has made the
highest bid and who has to pay just the amount of his last bid
The English Auction
Procedure Rules The price of the item is continuously raised Bidders who
are unwilling to pay the current price drop out until only one bidder remains
which has the highest value for the item
Award The remaining bidder gets the good for the price of his last bid
Strategical Analysis The best strategy for a bidder is to raise his bid until his
maximum willingness to pay is reached or no other bidder is willing to overbid
him
Outcome Consequently the payed price for the piece of good is the willingness
of the bidder with the second highest value to pay plus a tiny amount to outbid
him Since the bidder with the highest valuation or willingness to pay always
gets the item awarded the EA provides an economically ecient allocation
The Dutch Auction
Procedure Rules The Dutch auction DA starts with a price which is very
likely to exceed the reservation prices of all bidders The auctioneer lowers grad
ually that price until a bidder agrees to buy the item for the lastly announced
price
Award The rst bidder gets the unit at the currently announced price
Strategical Analysis Strategical bidding behaviour is inherent to this mecha
nism Each bidder is tempted to counterspeculate the other agents reservation
prices

in order to anticipate their bids barely before the auctioneer reaches the
corresponding reservation prices
Outcome Generally not economically ecient because the outcome is inu
enced by speculations about other agents reservation prices Therefore the win
ning bidder is not necessarily the one with the highest willingness to pay


The maximal price that a bidder is willing to pay for an item or the minimal payment that
a competitor in an invitation to bid accepts for his service is called reservation price


The FirstPrice Sealed Bid Auction
Procedure Rules All bidders make one sealed bid
Award The highest bidder gets the item and pays the price he bid for
Strategical Analysis Just as in the Dutch auction in the FirstPrice Auction
FPA strategical bidding behaviour is inherent to this mechanism Each bidder
is tempted to counterspeculate the other agents reservation prices in order to
give up a sealed bid that is slightly higher than the best bid of the competing
agents In so far the DA and the FPA are strategically equivalent
Outcome In general this procedure will not achieve the desired objective of
awarding the item to the bidder with the highest value because the outcome
is inuenced by beliefs about other agents reservation prices Therefore the
winning bidder is not necessarily the one with the highest willingness to pay
 The Vickrey 	SecondPrice SealedBid

Auction
Dominant truthrevealing strategies simplify bid preparation because it
is optimal for a bidder to follow the truthrevealing strategy even if he
assigns a positive probability to the possibility that his competitors will
not reveal the truth but deviate from their equilibrium strategies and lie
Procedure Rules All bidders make one sealed bid
Award The item is awarded to the bidder with the highest bid but the winning
bidder has to pay only the secondhighest bid
Strategical Analysis The VA is incentivecompatible That is placing bids
that reect their true individual valuations for the desired item is a dominant
strategy for participating agents In so far the VA strategically resembles the
EA
Outcome Thus the Vickrey auction assigns the good to the person with the
highest value regardless of the accuracy of the beliefs of the participants In this
way it provides a way to achieve the result of the English auctionnamely an
economically ecient allocationwithout iterations
 Advantages of the Vickrey Auction
Vickrey Vickrey 
  showed that in a sealedbid secondprice auction for sym
metric riskneutral bidding agents it is a dominant strategy to bid their true cost
or values ie truthrevealing strategies are not only equilibrium but also domi
nant strategies A proof is also given in Varian 	 This is due to the fact that
the winning agent is charged an amount equal to the second highest instead of
his highest bid This splits the correlation between the height of his bid and the
price that the agent has to pay for the item That is the amount of a bid an agent


places only determines its rank among all bids and nothing else If an agent bids
an amount below his true valuation he has a smaller chance of winning and thus
risks losing the award Overbidding on the other hand involves the risk of losing
utility Since if an agent overbids his true valuation and this makes the dierence
between winning or not then he places the highest bid though he has only an
individual valuation that ranks behind the secondhighest bid Consequently he
has to pay a price above his valuation and loses utility
Therefore strategic deliberations do not pay out for an agent in the VA and
produce only overhead which is resource consuming In both the VA and the
EA truthtelling is the dominant equilibrium strategy that leads to complete
economic eciency That is the bidder with the highest value for an item or
lowest cost in performing a task always wins the item or task There is no
chance that a bidder with a higher value will lose the auction to a bidder with a
lower value Vickrey showed that the VA is logically isomorph or strategically
equivalent to the English auction procedure in private value auctions But they
are not strategically equivalent in general In private value auctions they will
produce the same allocation at the same prices But this result does not hold for
correlated value auctions because in them the valuation of a bidder depends on
the valuations of other bidders And this information need about other bidders
is satised in the EA but not in the VA Therefore they may lead to dierent
results
The VA shows the following properties desirable for a coordination mechanism
  Eciency It is economically ecient bidder with highest valua
tion%lowest cost wins the auction The fact that the agents reveal their
preferences truthfully allows globally ecient decisions to be made
  Simplicity The VA causes low communication cost only sealed bid and
win%loss message broadcasting and low computation cost Strategy delib
erations and counterspeculating other agents do not pay out because the
valuations of other agents do not matter in making the bidding decision
  Stability and IncentiveCompatibility Agents have no incentive to
deviate from truth truthtelling is the dominant strategy
  Shortcomings of the Vickrey Auction
Even though Vickrey auctions show those desired criteria for an e
cienct and acceptable coordination mechanism due to Rothkopf et al 
Sandholm  Lesser 	 their applications are quite rare
The Vickrey mechanism was developed to promote truthful bidding and to avoid
counterspeculation among selfinterested agents Despite its counterspeculation
reducing eects limitations and deciencies


  Collusion vulnerability Bidders could form a bidding coalition in order
to coordinate their bids such that the second highest lowest bid in the VA
stays articially lower higher than the true second lowest highest bid of
the collusive members of the coalition That way the winning bidder has
the chance to be charged a lower payment or to receive a higher payment
This means that the VA is not coalitionproof But the simple auction
mechanisms mentioned above are not coalitionproof too If an auctioneer
wants to aggravate collusive agent behaviour he should not use a VA or
EA mechanism because collusive agreements are in them more stable than
in a DA or FPA mechanism Rasmusen 


  Auctioneer reliability
The auctioneer has to be truthful Otherwise he could overstate the sec
ond highest or understate the second lowest bid to the winning agent and
charge him a higher price respectively give him a lower payment Addi
tionally because of the high grade of information revealing the auctioneer
also learns about the competitiveness strategies and true cost of partici
pating agents and could pass these discoveries to competing agents This
insincerity about the reliability of the auctioneer has been suggested by
Rothkopf et al  to be the main reason why Vickrey auctions are quite
rarely used in auctions among humans
The problem of Auctioneer reliability is likely to be solved by cryptographic
signatures on each submitted bid such that a winning bidder is able to check
if the second highest bid announced by the auctioneer really has been placed
by another agent
In the simple auction protocolspresented in the previous sectionthis
problem cannot occur because each bidder pays his own bid amount in the
winning case
  Recontracting problem The VA assures truthpromotion only for
privatevalue auctions
 


In contracting protocolslike the contract net protocolwhere a con
tractee can recontract out a task that he contracted in the contractees

You can see this by assuming that some bidder has a value of  while the other bidders
have only values up to  Now the bidder with lower values agree to understate and to bid at
most  In the VA the bidder with highest value can bid this value and does not risk losing
the item while proting from the collusion In the EA he also does not risk losing the item
because he is always able to overbid other agents that do break the collusive agreement But
in the DA and the FPA for proting from the collusive agreement the bidder with highest
value has to underbid even the second highest value among the other bidders and therefore
risks losing the item if they break the agreement
 
In privatevalue auctions an agents marginal costvaluation for a taskitem is totally de
termined locally and independent of other agents marginal costvaluations

marginal cost for a task is at least to some extent dened by the po
tential recontracting prices Therefore such settings are not pure private
value auctions but correlated value auctions and truthful bidding is not
necessarily the dominant strategy Sandholm  Lesser 	
  

  Future contingencies problem Future contingencies could pro
mote strategic behaviour if they can inuence marginal cost calcula
tions%valuations when the VA or another auction is applied to a series
of contracts of task sets Because the marginal cost determination of a
certain task set can eect the marginal cost of other task sets potentially
negotiated over in the future This is also a reason for the general unsuit
ability of the VA for cases with uncertain or unknown cost
  Minimum win claims In the contracting setting dependent on their
underlying utility function agents could be lazy in that they are not willing
to perform tasks with low win margins They generally feel not lucky when
they have to perform a task and thereby are only compensated for their
cost Instead of this they strive after realising a certain minimum win
with each of their actions depending on the taken eorts For instance an
autonomous forwarding company generally will not be willing to forward
a shipment of oranges from California to Colorado for a win of 	 dollars
Therefore in bidding the company might be tempted to overstate its true
cost in order to guarantee itself a minimum win in the winning case
Whenever only relatively few shipping agents possess the ability to per
form a special kind of tasks but the demand for those task performing
abilities is comparatively high such strategies may pay out But whenever
there are quite many agents competing for comparatively few orders and
whenmoreoverthose agents have similar cost for performing a task such
strategies will fail
  Hiding of sensitive information If the outcomes of VAs are revealed an
agents competitors can gure out information about the cost or valuation
structure and the competitiveness of this agent Firstprice auction mech
anisms do not as clearly reveal those information because in them bids are
generally more strategic than truthful
In domains where the mentioned problem types are excluded Vickrey auctions
succeed to guarantee truthrevelation and therefore an optimal ecient allocation
of tasks
  
The higher the environment dynamics the more the recontracting deliberations can be
reduced Also the auctioned tasks could be bookmarked to restrict task recontracting to a
desired amount
 
There are several publications which are dealing with the usability of
Vickrey auctions in multiagent systems eg Huberman  Clearwater 	
Drexler  Miller  among others
 The Multistaged Extended Vickrey Auction
The Multistaged Extended Vickrey Auction MEVA is a auction proce
dure that aims at the promotion of coalitionforming Weinhardt et al 
c
Weinhardt et al 
a Weinhardt et al 
b As such the MEVA tries to solve
an important problem of DAI namely how agents can be enabled to make use of
synergies by forming coalitions or by starting cooperations It would be ideal if
individual agents could nd cooperation partners explicitly through negotiations
and bid together with them as a coalition in the auction
In the process of coalition formation the following inherent problem always arises
An individual agent does not know if he can realise a higher prot by joining a
coalition or by making a bid on its own Thus a coordination mechanism that
encourages coalition forming has to give each agent an incentive to join the
coalition In order to full the principle of individual rationality the mechanism
must guarantee each single bidder joining a coalition at least that payo he
would have got bidding on his ownhis individually realisable prot or reference
win rw To assure incentive compatibility the mechanism has to guarantee it to
each participating agent
For solving this problem the Multistaged Extended Vickrey Auction MEVA
was developed It guarantees that each individual agent has an incentive to join
a coalition in that it assures each single bidder joining a coalition his reference
win
 Specication of the MEVA Procedure
A Rough Overview of the MEVA Procedure
By this coordination mechanism tasks are auctioned o in an iterativemultistaged
bidding process whereby the number of general stages equals the number of
participating agents After the general stages an additional termination stage
follows in which the auctioned task is awarded its price settled and possible
reference wins ascertained
In each general stage i i        n of the MEVA exclusively coalitions consisting
of i agents are asked to make a bid
In each stage the auctioneer stores the bids together with the coalitions that
made them A feedback about the award of the task and the charged price is
given by the auctioneer not in the single stages but only after the nth stage of
the MEVA in the termination stage

The award goes to the coalition with the highest bid of all rounds which is charged
according to the Vickrey principle a price equalling the secondhighest bid of all
rounds Thereby in the ascertainment of the secondhighest bid bids that were
made in previous rounds by members of the winning coalition are excluded
After the award the auctioneer has to investigate a reference win minimum
win a coalition would have got by making a bid on its own if a subset of the
winning coalition has made at any stage of the MEVA as individual or coalition
the highest bid of that stage and this bid was higher than the price the winning
coalition nally has to pay
In the following an algorithmic specication of the stages of the MEVA procedure
will be given for which rstly some notations have to be explained
Notation for the MEVA
hb
i
 highest bid of stage i
hb

i
 highest bid of all stages  i
hb

 highest bid of all stages
shb
i
 second highest bid of stage i
ashb

i
 admissible second highest bid of all stages  i
ashb

 admissible second highest bid of all stages
bidderbid
i
  agent or coalition which made bid
i
rwbidder  reference win of bidder
Initial Stage
The initial stage of the MEVA corresponds to the simple VA besides that hb
 
and shb
 
are not announced publicly
Initial stage of the MEVA
  Individual agents are asked to make a bid for the item or task
  The auctioneer stores the highest bid hb

 
and the second highest bid ashb

 
with the corresponding bidders
End of the initial stage of the MEVA
General Stage
If in a stage i line   no agent or coalition of agents has made a bid the MEVA
goes on to the next stage i !   where coalitions of size i !   are asked to make

Figure   Initial stage of the MEVA
bids except if i equals n ie the grand coalition was asked to make a bid line
 In that case the MEVA goes to its termination stage with its highest and
secondhighest bids being the highest and secondhighest bids of all previous
stages lines 
 
General stage i of the MEVA
  if there is no placed bid hb
i
 then
 if i  n
 then goto stage i !  
	 else

 hb

 hb

i 
 ashb

 ashb

i 
 goto termination stage
 end
  else
   if hb
i
 hb

i 
  then
  shb

i
 hb

i 
  ashb

i
 maxhb
i
 shb

i 

 	 award tentatively bidderhb

i

 
 goto stage i !  
  end
  if hb
i
 hb

i 
  then hb

i
 hb
i
and
 if bidderhb

i 
  bidderhb

i


  then
 ashb

i
 maxshb
i
 hb

i 

 award tentatively bidderhb

i

 goto stage i!  
	 end

 else
 if bidderhb

i 
  bidderhb

i
 and hb

i 
 shb
i
 
 then
 calculate and store rwbidderhb
i 

 
 ashb

i
 maxshb

i 
 shb
i

  award tentatively bidderhb

i

 goto stage i!  
 else
 if bidderhb

i 
  bidderhb

i
and hb

i 
 shb
i
	 then

 ashb

i
 shb
i
 award tentatively bidderhb

i

 goto stage i!  
 end
 end
  end
 end
 end
End of the general stage of the MEVA
If at least one bid has been placed the highest bid hb
i
of stage i can be
determined If this is lower than the highest bid hb

i 
of all previous stages this
remains the highest in stage i and hb

i
is set to hb

i 
 Then the bidder who is ten
tatively awarded the task stays the same the admissible secondhighest bid of all
run stages is possibly updated and the MEVA goes to its next stage lines    

Otherwise if the highest bid in stage i turns out to be the highest bid of all
stages hb

i
has to be set to hb
i
line  
If no subset of the coalition of agents that has made the current highest bid has
made the highest bid of all previous stages nothing special happens Then the
MEVA updates its admissible secondhighest bid so far awards tentatively the
coalition with the current highest bid and enters its next stage lines  	
 
The auctioneer calculates a reference win for a subset of the coalition with the highest bid
hb

i
at stage i if that subset made the highest bid at a previous stage and this bid is also higher
than the second highest bid of the current stage shb

i

 
Because bidderhb
i  
 would have got the item alone if he had not joined the winning
coalition bidderhb
i

	
Even if a subset of the coalition of agents that has made the current highest bid
has made the highest bid of all previous stages the MEVA runs through the
same steps if their previous bid is outperformed by the secondhighest bid of the
current stage lines 
An interesting case occurs when a subset of the currently highestbidding coalition
has made the highest bid of all previous stages and this bid outperforms the
secondhighest bid made in stage i line  Then in order to make joining the
larger coalition individually rational for that subset its reference win has to be
calculated and stored which may be needed in the later termination stage line
 After that the MEVA runs through the habitual steps lines 
Figure  Second stage of the MEVA
Termination Stage
Termination of the MEVA
Awarding and price settlement proceed according to the Vickrey mechanism
  The current tentatively awarded agent or coalition has made the highest bid
hb

of all stages and hence gets the item at a price equal to the admissible
second highest bid ashb

of all stages
 

 
In determing the charged admissible second highest bid the auctioneer does not take into
account bids from previous stages that were made by subsets of coalitions that bid at the last
stage


  The coalition win has to be split up among the members of the winning
coalition while a possible reference win rwsub accrued for a subset sub of
the winning coalition has to be taken into account
do
procedure split up winset of agents
  if  rwsub for sub  set of agents then the auctioneer announces
sub and rwsub to all coalition members
 sub receives its reference win
 call split up winsub
 the dierence between the joint coalition win and rwsub has to be
split up in further coalition negotiations between all coalition members
End of termination of the MEVA
Figure  Termination of the MEVA after stage 
  Analysis of the MEVA
The MEVA mechanism provides an incentive to join coalitions and therefore
seems to guarantee ecient allocations
Critical Remarks
Regarding the MEVA mechanism three critical remarks have to be made

  It is doubtful if the MEVA is really able to rule out strategic bidding be
haviour
Lying could be protable for agents because overbidding true valuations
in the rst stage could ensure higher reference wins if one makes it to join
a winning coalition at a later stage Therefore agents could be inclined to
overbid their true valuations in the rst round if they think that they have
a good chance to join a competitive coalition in a following stage
 Besides this Weinhardts explanation Weinhardt et al 
c of the MEVA
mechanism lacks elaborateness and clarityregarding
i the allowed coalition forming processes
He gives no comment as to whether at stage  the forming of coalition
ABF as in Figure  would be allowed at all after F has joined a
coalition with other agents in a previous stage who do not participate
in ABF Assuming it would be allowed he still leaves it unclear
which price p  ashb

that coalition would have to pay According to
Weinhardts MEVA rules ABF would have not to pay shb

 

because this bid has been made by the coalition EF in which F was
member
Furthermore according to the rulesbecause the second and the third
highest bid were also made by members of ABFthe admissible
second highest bid would be only 	 made by agent G at stage  
instead of 
 in the scenario shown in Figure 
ii the division of coalition winset of agents  reference winsub
among all agents  set of agents
 Application of the Shapley Value for Prot Division
in the MEVA
There is a lack of fair prot division schemes among agents in the DAI literature
As mentioned above though the MEVA mechanism introduces a reference win
concept it leaves this problem halfway unsolved as far as the division of the
residue of the coalition win is concerned The MEVA mechanism tells us only
that the residuing coalition win is split up by a negotiation process but gives us
no advice in the choice of a special negotiation mechanism
In the scenario of Figure  the joint coalition win of ABG that has to be
split up among AB and G by negotiation amounts to 	
 	 More
precisely because the reference win of AB amounts to 
  	
units of money have to be divided among all coalition members and  currency
units among the coalitions subset AB

Figure  Lack of elaborateness in the MEVA mechanism
Sequence of coalition membership
and contribution to the joint coalition win
 st A A B B G G
nd B G A G B A
P
rd G B G A A B
A      	 	    
Agent B    	     	 
G 	  	     
Table  Shapley value calculation for ABG
For this purpose the Shapley value Shapley 	a see Table  can be used
According to the Shapley value As share in the joint coalition win would be
winA   
   


 

 Bs share would amount to %
 




 and
F would get  %
  



 units of money if the Shapley value is used as prot
division scheme
Now assume the forming of the coalition ABF see Figure  would be al
lowed Weinhardt leaves it unclear which price p  ashb

that coalition would
have to pay If Weinhardts MEVA rules were followed strictly ABF would
not have to pay shb

 
 because this bid has been made by the coalition
EF in which F was member
Furthermore according to the rulesbecause the second and the third highest

Sequence of coalition membership
and contribution to the joint coalition win
 st A A B B F F
nd B F A F B A
P
rd F B F A A B
A      	 	    	
Agent B        
F       

Table  Shapley value calculation for ABF
bid were also made by members of ABFthe admissible second highest bid
would be only 	 made by agent G at stage   instead of 
 in the scenario
shown in Figure 
It is doubtful if the price settlement according to the MEVA pricing rules is
accepted by sellers if agents are allowed to leave their old coalition partners and
join another coalition from one stage to another
In the scenario of  the joint coalition win of ABF amounts to 	
	 	 The reference win of AB amounts to 
	 	 Hence
	 currency units have still to be divided among the coalition members by
negotiation
The resulting table for the calculation of the Shapley value is table  According
to the Shapley value As share in the coalition win joint would be winA 
 	
  	 Bs share would amount to 
   	 and F would get


    units of money
 Matrix Auctions
Matrix auctions MA are applicable for the simultaneous assignment of multiple
items or tasks to agents
We have a standard assignment problem if only one job is to be assigned to a
single organisational unit If we have several tasks to assign they can be assigned
either successively or simultaneously
The valuation of a set of items can dier signicantly from the sum of the
valuations of each single item For instance this may be the case if the items to
be allocated reect tasks Performing tasks is resource consuming and therefore
may result in a loss of utility which can be reected by a negative bid Negative

bids are explicitly allowed in a matrix auction They are useful if a set of tasks
has to be completely performed by a group of agents
 Matrix Auctions for Multiple Identical Items
The agents get the information about the item by broadcast or over a blackboard
They calculate their valuations
 	
and report them to the auctioneer
From the transmitted valuations or bids of the agents the auctioneer sets up a
matrix whose cells represent the bids of the agents for each number of jobs
An assignment algorithm can evaluate an ecient allocation from this data The
assignment algorithm has thereby to be adapted to the facts that the maximum
of assignments in each row equals one and that the sum of the assignments in
each column multiplied with the number of columns adds up to m at most
Price Settlement According to the Vickrey Principle
For each number of tasks belonging to the optimum allocation the bidder with the
highest bid receives the job and has to pay the secondhighest price If there is
more than one marked cell the Vickrey pricing mechanism for m identical items
 
Vickrey 
  is applied
Vickrey points out that this method for price settlement has the    advantage
of reducing the probability that a bidder	s own bid will a
ect the price he receives
thus inducing bids closer to the full value to the bidder improving the chances of
obtaining or approaching the optimum allocation of resources and reducing e
ort
and expense devoted to socially superuous investigation of the general market
situationVickrey 
  The proof that it isnt rational for a bidder to make a
bid above or below his true valuation is analogous to the single auction
But Vickrey also remarks that this    result applies only to cases where each
bidder is interested in at most a single unit and there is no collusion among the
bidders Problems also arise when the number of bidders is too few to produce
a fully competitive market and simultaneously an individual bidder is interested
in allocating two or more of the units because the bid oered for the second unit
will be inuenced by the possible eect of this bid on the price to be paid for the
rst
Example Assume that there are  identical items to assign and that there are
 agents A B and C that report the following valuations or bids respectively
 
Whereby often the valuation of m items or tasks does not equal m times the valuation of
one item or task Often there is neither a linear nor a monotonous correlation between the
valuation of one task to another
 
m items are sold to the m highest bidders for the uniform price of the m  st highest
bid
 
Number of identical items
Agent     
A )
)   
B ))   
C 	 ) )  
Then the allocation that maximises social welfare respective global utility is the
one marked with asterisks According to the matrix auction rules A and B have
to pay an amount corresponding to the thirdhighest bid 	 C has to pay the
secondhighest price 
But for this class of allocation problems an ecient allocation does not necessarily
mean that the award goes to the agent who made the highest bid Furthermore
each package size can get assigned to several agents
When an agent is assigned to an item or item package for which he has not made
the highest bid then he has not to pay the secondhighest but the nextlower
bid
Therefore agent C still has to pay  currency units for a package of  items
when agent As valuation for this package is heightened to   
Number of identical items
Agent     
A )
)     
B ))   
C 	 ) )  
  Matrix Auctions for Multiple Heterogeneous Items
Here more data has to be communicated to the agents If the set of items contains
m items the agents are asked to calculate their valuations for 
n
   potential
item or task combinations
From the transmitted bids or reported valuations of the agents the auctioneer sets
up a matrix whose cells represent the bids of the agents for each combination of
tasks Starting from this he identies the optimal allocation For this variation
of the assignment problem he uses an algorithm that has to consider that the
maximum of assignments in each row equals one Beyond this assigned task
combinations must not have any item or task in common ie they must be
disjunctive form a partition of the item set How this assignment problem can
be formalised and solved within a multiagent system is discussed in Ru 

Price Settlement According to the Vickrey Principle
The price for each assigned task subset equals the secondhighest bid in the matrix
column for that task set This Vickrey pricing assures that the agents reveal their
true valuations because the bid of an agent as revelation of his valuation for an
item does determine if he gets awarded the item but does not inuence the price
he has to pay for it
Example with  dierent items allocated to  agents
Task combinations
Agent f g fg fg f g f g fg f g
A     
    

B 	     	  
C   	 
    
According to the Vickrey principle agent C pays  currency units for item  and
agent B is charged  currency units for the items   and  together
Matrix Auction Analysis
Both Matrix auctions apply the Vickrey mechanism for price settlement and hence
are incentive compatible the bid only determines whether the bidder belongs to
the m highest bidders but does not determine the purchase price
They dier in the used assignment algorithms to calculate an optimal allocation
 Clarke Taxing Auction Procedures
In the following we examine variants of the Vickrey and English auctionused
as allocation mechanisms for multiple itemsin which agents make monetary
payments to the planner
As in the other above presented allocation mechanisms agents have again no
incentive to misrepresent their true preferences ie to lie in order to get a
better outcome when they are not able to form coalitions
 The Clarke Tax
The Clarke Tax Mechanism CTM Clarke   Clarke  Rosenschein et al  
Rosenschein  Ephrati  aalso referred to as the ClarkeGroves mechanism
Emons is a nonmanipulable oneshot votingbybid mechanism that
extracts truth from agents in quasilinear environments Clarkes Mechanism

makes sure that each voting agent has only one dominant strategy telling the
truth
 
 by charging a tax based on how much the agent was able to sway the
assignment decision The problem can be mathematically formalised as follows
  
 
  
n
  true types of all agents
R  r
 
  r
n
  reported types of all agents

i
 true types of all agents except i
R
i
 reported types of all agents except i
x  social choice function
x

  social choice where the system cannot improve
t
i
 money transfer to or from agent i
v
i
x  valuation of agent i for an allocation x
An agent pays nothing if its announcement does not change the decision but it
does pay if its inuence is pivotal Each agent is ned with a tax that equals the
portion of its bid that made a dierence to the outcome By informing agents of
the taxing mechanism in advance the agents have no incentive to lie about their
preferences
Clarke tax
i
R  t
i
R  

P
j i
v
j
x

R



P
j i
v
j
x

R
i


If an agent does not change the allocation decision then both sums are equal so
the transfer is  In general the total tax will decrease as the number of agents
increases The more agents make their bids the greater is the chance of any
single agent to actually change the decision approaches zero
Origin of the CTM
The CTM is a member of the family of Groves mechanisms Groves  All
mechanisms of this class ensure that in quasilinear environments telling the truth
is a dominant strategy for agents Therefore the agents do not need to waste
eort in counterspeculating each others preferences All Grove mechanisms have
the general form
t
i
  

P
j i
v
j
all

 
j


Grove tax
 	
A proof that revealing true preferences is the dominant strategy can be found in
Rosenschein  Ephrati b

Thus the more the agent alters the outcome of the mechanism with his bid the
higher the Grove tax But unfortunately the Grove tax cannot equal zero but
is a positive or even negative Raia  amount that has to be donated to or
funded from outside It has been shown Laont  Maskin  that among the
members of this decision mechanism family CTM requires the least amount of
tax to be paid
Disadvantages
The Clarke taxing scheme incorporates an eective incentive mechanism for
telling the truth in a group decision mechanism Hence the CTM could be used
as an eective preference revealer in the domain of automated agents that re
duces the need for explicit negotiation Unfortunatelybecause it belongs to the
family of Grove mechanismsit has also two important disadvantages Firstly it
can be manipulated by coalitions of agentslike the Vickrey auction Currently
there exist no techniques to deal with this Secondly the Clarke Tax must not
be used to benet those whose voting resulted in its charging Instead it must ei
ther be wasted or spent outside the voting group which would necessitate having
distinct voting groups The latter disadvantage is called the tax waste problem
The following example makes clear how the Clarke Tax is calculated and why the
tax must be spent outside a voting group in order to prevent untruthful bidding
Calculation of the Clarke Tax
Let us assume that the participating agents have the following valuations for a
set of items
Items and valuations
Agent    
A  		 
B 		 	 
C   		
First each agent i states a report r
i
 truthful or not  of his preferences which
denes R Then the total score for x

R and for each schedule x

R
i
 i e
resulting schedule if agent i had not voted are calculated The assignments of the
allocation x

R
true
 in the case of unexceptionally truthful reports are highlighted
by bold print in the table above
	
Allo Assignments Valuations v
j
P
j
v
j
with Tax
cation A B C A B C
P
j
v
j
j A j  B j  C
x

R                 
x

R
A
            
x

R
B
            
x

R
C
           
When all the agents report their valuations truthfully the group utility max
imising allocation x

R is chosen If A had not voted B and C would still have
been assigned the same items by the planner If B had not voted A would have
been assigned item   instead of item  Such an assignment would increase As
utility by an amount of   while the utility of C would stay the same Thus
agent B is ned with its Clarke tax t
B
R    because he has aected the
outcome by his vote by a magnitude of
t
B
R  

P
j B
v
j
x

R



P
j B
v
j
x

R
i


        
The other agents are not ned because even without their vote the assignments
of items to agents do not change
Clarke Taxing Prevents Untruthful Bidding
Now let us assume that the valuations of the agents are not known publicly and
agent A reports untruthfully a valuation of   for item   because he aspires to
be assigned to this item Then the report table looks like
Items and valuations
Agent    
A  			  
B  		 
C   		
and the following taxing table results


Allo Assignments Valuations v
j
P
j
v
j
with Tax
cation A B C A B C
P
j
v
j
j A j B j C
x

R       	        	
x

R
A
            
x

R
B
           
x

R
C
       	   	  
If agent A overbids his true valuations he nally pays with t
A
  a tax that
is larger than his true preferences warrant Because his true valuation for item 
is  but he has to pay a tax of  he nally can only realise a surplus of 

But this is   less than his valuation for item  that would have been assigned
to him by truthful bidding Thus overbidding results in a loss of utility
Likewise if an agent underbids to change the outcome and save himself some tax
he will always lose utility The saved tax will never compensate him for this loss
Tax Waste Necessity Similarly if agent A knew that he would get a portion
of the tax as compensation for the losers or as an equally distributed share he
would also be tempted to overstate his valuation for item   for example by 	
because this would raise Bs tax by 	 up to  	and consequently As share
of the tax
Allo Assignments Valuations v
j
P
j
v
j
with Tax
cation A B C A B C
P
j
v
j
j A j B j C
x

R                 
x

R
B
     	    	   	
Ephrati and Rosenschein Rosenschein  Ephrati  a suggest a solution to this
problem They propose to use the tax for the benet of agents outside the voting
group They suggest partitioning the entire agent society into disjoint voting
groups When a voting group A
voting
completes the assignment process each
taxed agent a
taxed
 A
voting
has to distribute his tax equally among a
j
 AnA
voting
or a randomly chosen a
j
 Agents can be grouped based on common or conicting
interests Agents who take part in an auction for an indivisable item could form
a group because they compete for that special item and thus have conicting
goals

Ephrati and Rosenschein Rosenschein  Ephrati  a also suggest that the vot
ing group solution to the tax waste problem might impose the need for an exten
sive bookkeeping mechanism where each agents tax debts are recorded This
would allow an agent to pay his debts by giving other agents support in achiev
ing their goals later on The fact that the tax must leave the group prevents the
decision from being pareto optimal because any taxpayer could improve its own
utility by the amount of the tax without changing the other agents utilities
Conclusion Usability
The CTM saves each agent from the computational complexity of guessing what
the others preferences and strategies are what the negotiation set is and how it
can be manipulated This simplicity of strategy is highly desirable in the design
of automated agents Because the agents tell the truth out of their selfinterest
the CTM meets both the simplicity and stability criteria and also individual
rationality etc
Ephrati has investigated the usability of the Clarke tax mechanism for reaching a
multiagent consensus Rosenschein  Ephrati  eg in a multiagent planning
problem Ephrati  Rosenschein  Ephrati  Rosenschein  Ephrati  b
and in a meetingscheduling problem Rosenschein et al  
Clarke Taxing Results in a Vickrey Auction
When the Clarke Tax mechanism is used to allocate a single item the solution
that extracts truth is exactly the Vickrey auction The winning agent i is piv
otal to the decision because without i someone else would have won the auction
namely the agent with the second highest bid and the resulting assignment
would have been another
According to the Clarke taxing scheme agent i pays the value of the outcome to
all the other agents when i participates minus the value to the other agents if
i had not participated
Suppose agent i bids first price agent j bids second price and all other agents
bid below second price
Since there is only a single indivisable item to be allocated the value to the other
agents not assigned to it is  And without i js value would have been its bid
the value to the other agents would again be  Thus the payment of agent i
is
p
i
  second price  

P
j i
v
j
x

R



P
j i
v
j
x

R
i


 t
i
R

The Generalised Vickrey Auction
  Each bidding agent i reports a valuation function r
i
 which may or may
not be the truth
 The auctioneer calculates the allocation x

R that maximises the sum of
the reported valuations
 The auctioneer also calculates the allocation x

R
i
 that maximises the
sum of the valuations subject to the constraint that neither of the valuations
nor resources of bidder i are taken into account
 Each participating agent i receives the bundle x

i
and receives the payment
t
i
R  
P
j i
r
j
x

R r
j
x

R
i
 from the auctioneer
End of the generalised Vickrey auction
According to this scheme the nal payo to agent i in the GVA is given by
u
i
x

R  v
i
x

R !

P
j i
r
j
x

R
P
j i
r
j
x

R
i


  The Generalised Vickrey Auction
The Generalised Vickrey Auction GVA Varian 	 is a Clarke taxing procedure
that is eligible for resource reallocation and not only for resource allocation as
the original CTM Insofar it works for a broader class of resource allocation
problems The GVA has principally the same taxing scheme as the CTM But
it diers from the CTM in that it can not only be used to allocate but also to
reallocate resources because in the calculation of x

R
i
 it is not only prohibited
to take into account not only is valuations but additionally is resources
Just as a bidder does not want to reveal his valuation to the seller the participants
in a resource allocation problem will in general not want to reveal their
true utility functions Varian proofs that if the GVA mechanism is used it is in
the interest of each participating agent i to report his true valuation function
r
i
  
i
 to the central resources allocating planner respective auctioneer
Varian 	 The GVA proceeds as follows
Suppose there are i     n agents who each get awarded j    m goods
Let x
j
i
be the award of a piece of good j to agent i Good  will denote money

and x
i
 x
 
i
  x
m
i
 is the assigned bundle of goods to agent i Each agent i
holds some initial bundle *x
i
and some initial amount of money *x
i



A reasonable objective in allocating the goods among the consumers is to allocate
them in a way that maximises the sum of the individual utilities
Comparison between the GVA for Multiple Identical Items and the
MIA
Assume that there are  identical items to assign and that there are  agents A
B and C that report the following valuations or bids respectively
Number of identical items
Agent     
A )		)   
B ))   
C 	 ) )  
Then the allocation that maximises social welfare respective global utility is the
one marked with asterisks Both the matrix auction and the GVA promote
truthful bidding and result in the same allocation But the settled prizes dier
According to the matrix auction rules A and B have to pay an amount corre
sponding to the thirdhighest bid 	 C has to pay the secondhighest price

But applying the GVA other payments p
i
are settled that correspond to
p
i
 j
P
j i
r
j
x


P
j i
r
j
x

i
j ie
p
A
 jt
A
j  j   j  	  	
p
B
 jt
B
j  j 		  j   	  	
p
C
 jt
C
j  j	  	j  
	  
The winning agents payments in the GVA decrease proportional to their utility
contribution to the utility maximising allocation In contrary to this in the
matrix auction their contribution in maximising the global utility is not taken
into account when prices are settled
 The VickreyLeonard Auction
The VickreyLeonard VL auction Olson  Porter  Leonard  is a Clarke
taxing procedure and as such a multiitem generalisation of the Vickrey auction

to obtain an outcomeecient allocation The VL auction has the theoretical
property that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy
Each agent i submits a vector r
i
of sealed bids r
i
j
for all items j being sold to
the system These are interpreted as an indicator of the agents welfare ie in
the equation system A for solving the assignment problem  i j 
i
j
is replaced
by r
i
j
submittedpossibly untruthfulbids in place of the true valuations
Thereafter a smart market computer algorithm solves A and thereby determines
the assignment of agents to items ie allocation that maximises the sum of
the agents individual welfares Then the priceie the Clarke taxan agent
has to pay for his assigned item is determined by solving either a dual program
D to A or by calculating the impact of an additional unit of this item on
the optimal assignment see Price Settlement Those calculated prices are also
called Vickrey prices
Allocation Procedure
The assignment algorithm nds the combination of assignments for which the
total of the winning bids for all m units is the greatest one buyer can get at
most one unit If two or more assignments yield the same maximum total
the assignment is chosen randomly
Example
Items and bids
Agent    
A
g
 		 
B 		 	 
C  
g
		
The fat table entries mark the resulting allocation Even though Agent A bid
the most on unit   he does not receive that unit because the above determined
assignment yields with   the highest possible total of the winning bids
Price Settlement
  Price calculation by taking into account an additional unit of an
item
 
  Calculate the total of the bids for the allocated m units
 For each unit i do
a Suppose that there is an extra unit i
extra
available and therefore a
total of m!   units to be sold
b Calculate for this problem a new assignment that maximises the
total bid amount
a

 Calculate the dierence between the two totals This dierence is the
price charged for unit i
a
Notice The new total bid amount is at least as high as the amount in step  because
there are more combinations available and all of the combinations previously available are
still available
Example When an extra unit  
extra
is taken into account a new allocation
e
x
results that raises the total bid amount to   and in which agent A receives
unit   agent B receives unit  
extra
and agent C receives unit 
Items and bids
Agent      
extra
A
g
 		  
B 		 	 
g

C  
g
		 
The charged price for unit   is   because it is determined by the dierence
between the two bid totals Extra units of unit  or  available leave the allocation
unchanged Therefore the price of both units is zero
Untruthful Bidding Now lets assume that the valuations of the agents are
not known publicly and agent A bids untruthfully   for item   According to
the notation used above the following allocation results
Items and bids
Agent      
extra
A
g
 			    
B  		 
g

C  
g
		 

The charged price for item   is then  The total welfare amount of the
assignment determined without the item  
extra
is   The assignment taking
into account the item  
extra
yields a total welfare of   Their dierence
amounts to  instead of   in the case above where agent A bid truthfully
Thusbecause of his untruthfulnessagent A has to pay   currency units
more for item  
 Price calculation by solving a minimisation problem with constraints
Another possibility to determine prices in the VL auction is to solve the dual
program D to A see Section    in which we have to minimise the sum
P
j M
p
j
of the prices paid for the assigned items j M  ie to determine
min
p
j
P
j M
p
j
with respect to the following set of constraints the w

i
s are slack variables
w
i
! p
j
 
i
j
i  N j M
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j
!
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i
 W
w
i
 p
j
  i  N j M
 The VL Chit Mechanism
The VL chit mechanism has also been analysed by Olson  Porter  This
mechanismunlike the VL auctiondoes not require the use of monetary trans
fers to make an assignment Here the medium of exchange are called chits that
have a determined value only in the context of the given assignment problem
The VL chit mechanism is implemented as follows
Each agent has a predetermined chit budget and is allowed to bid a certain
number of chits for any of the announced items The chit bids are used in place
of the monetary bids in the VL auction to determine an allocation
The VL chit auction mechanism without monetary payments does not have a
dominant strategy equilibrium but it does have BayesNash equilibria It does
also not provide outcomes that are pareto optimal for all proles  There
fore it is worse than the VL auction with regard to the allocative eciency
Olson  Porter 
According to Olson  BayesNash equilibria do not elicit more information
about an agents relative valuations than just ordinal rankings

 The DGS Auction
The DGS Roth  Sotomayor   auction is a multiitem auction mechanism
which assures that truth telling is a dominant strategy for each bidder It is
a generalisation of both the progressive or English and the Vickrey auction
The DGS auction mechanism is applicable for cases in which a set of items is
to be distributed among a set of agents and no agent is interested in more
than one item It produces the minimum price equilibrium and therefore is
buyeroptimal
It is assumed that agents have a demand function ie thatgiven a vector of
prices for the itemsthey are able to specify which set of items possibly empty
they wish to buy
Demange Gayle and Sotomayor Demange et al 
 proposed two variations
namely the exact DGS auction and the approximate DGS auction
When there is only one item to allocate both variations can be implemented by
the following process that resembles the EA
The auctioneer begins with the items reservation price Then each bidder an
nounces whether he wants to buy the item at that price The price is increased
by a xed amount as long as more than one bidder demands the item If only
one bidder demands it that bidder is awarded the item at the announced price
and the auction for that item ends
 The Exact DGS Auction Mechanism for Multiple
Items
When a set of heterogeneous items is to be allocated the DGS auction proceeds
as follows see also Roth  Sotomayor   pp     The DGS auction
algorithm is a version of the Hungarian algorithm for the assignment problem
Kuhn 		
It is assumed that at each stage of the auction each bidder demands all items that
maximise his utility surplus at the current prices That is a bidder expresses
interest in more than one item if and only if they both maximise his
surplus at the given prices
The exact DGS auction
  Initial Step t  
  The auctioneer begins by announcing an initial price vector p


 equal
to the vector of the sellers reservation prices s
 Then each bidder announces which item or items j are in his demand
set at price p


j


  General step t  
  Given the demand selections or bids at prices p
t 
 an algorithm
determines if there are overdemanded
 
sets of items
 The planner locates with an algorithm Gale 
 a minimal overde
manded set MOS i e an overdemanded set with the property that
none of its proper subsets is overdemanded
 If there is no MOS the planner can assign each bidder an item he
demands and the auction terminates
 If he can locate a MOS he raises the price for each item in it by one
unit what denes p
t 

	 After that the planner asks the bidders for their demand sets at price
p
t 

  Termination
The auction terminates if there is no more overdemanded set of items
Then the agents are assigned to their selected items j at current prices p
t
j

End of the exact DGS auction
Olson and Porter Olson  Porter  propose the following eciency increasing
extension to this process
  They suggest that if an agent selects a nonoverdemanded item at an iter
ation he is committed to select that item still at the next iteration ie
an agent cannot withdraw on selections if the price of those selections does
not increase Then he would be automatically assigned to that item and
excluded from the auctioning of the remaining items
 at the end of the process unassigned items should be randomly allocated
among the last unassigned bidders who placed a bid on the items at a
previous iteration
The realisation of the second proposal is outlined in the following
 

A set of items is called overdemanded if the number of bidders demanding only items in
this set is greater than the number of items in the set
	
Demanded and assigned items at prices p
t
and p
t 

Price p
t
p
t 
Item        
A    		  
Agent B    		
C    
According to the DGS auction rules agents A and B are assigned to items  
and  emphasised by bold printing Hence they drop out for the assignment of
item  Agent C has reneged his selection of item  after its price raised to p
t 


But as unassigned agent he gets the unassigned item  at the price p
t

at which
he demanded it in the last cycle
However it seems that the exact DGS auction mechanism is dicult to implement
in realistic situations Firstly the communication cost are quite high Secondly
and more important in a DGS auction the agents are required to be quite precise
in their responses to changing prices They have to report at each stage t all their
surplus maximising items at prices p
t
 An agent cannot switch in one step from
one item to a dierent one but must demand his surplus maximising items of the
previous stage plus perhaps some others
  The Approximate DGS Auction Mechanism
In contrast to the exact DGS auction mechanism the approximate variant does
not require the bidders to decide in advance exactly what their bidding behaviour
will be Instead at each stage they can make use of present and past stages of
the auction to decide their next bids Insofar this variant is more appealing to
the bidders It proceeds as follows
The approximate DGS auction
  Initial step t  
  An initial price vector p


of the sellers reservation prices is an
nounced by the auctioneer
 Each bidder announces his demand for items at price p


 thereby com
mitting himself to possibly buying the item at the announced price
  General step t  


At each step t some subset of bidders is committed to some subset of
items at some set of prices
Any uncommitted bidder chooses one out of three alternative actions
he may
a bid for some unassigned item j
  he gets committed to that item at its initial price p


j

b bid for an assigned item j
  he gets committed to that item at price p
t
j
! 
 
  xed
amount and the bidder to whom j was previously assigned to
gets uncommitted
c drop out of the bidding
  Termination
The approximate DGS auction terminates when there are no more uncom
mitted bidders in the auction at which point each committed bidder buys
the item assigned to him at its current price
End of the approximate DGS auction
The outcome of the approximate DGS variant may depend on the order in which
agents bid Demange et al 
 show that the nal prices for the items in the
approximate DGS auction dier from the minimal equilibrium prices obtained in
the exact DGS auction by at most k  
 currency units where k is the minimum
of the number of items and bidders Demange et al 
 also show that one can
come arbitrarily close to the minimum equilibrium prices of the exact auction by
making the bid increasing rate 
 suciently small
Summary
The DGS auction generalises the VA to multiple items and produces an assign
ment that corresponds to a bipartite matching graph between a set of agents and
a set of items That is each agent receives at most one item but the DGS auction
does not assign necessarily all items to agents
As in the Vickrey secondprice auction for a single item the price a winning
bidder pays is not determined by the valuations he states but the valuations of
its competitors
The experiments of Olson and Porter Olson  Porter  showed that the DGS
auction outperforms the VL auction concerning the allocative eciency and the
seller surplus

 The EscalatingBid Auction
The EscalatingBid auction EBA is a lowoverhead auction procedure for allo
cating resources that are naturally divided into time slices It uses the Escalator
Algorithm Drexler  Miller  and is a mixed auction procedure because due to
this algorithm it combines properties of the EA and the VA The EBA was devel
oped as a marketlike mechanism for allocating processor time to computational
tasks in a decentralised fashion only guided by local knowledge and decisions
concerning task preferences The auction procedure can be used to schedule any
resource allocated on a timeslice by timeslice basis eg communication chan
nels airport landing rights etc
The auction for a special resource can be viewed as a virtual auction house with
multiple escalators in it An agent enters the auction and begins bidding for the
resource required for its task by placing an initial bid on one of the escalators
The seize of his bid determines its initial height on the chosen escalator Each
escalator rises at a dierent escalation rate er measured in currency units per
time unit raising its bids at that rate Fixed bids are hold by a special stationary
escalator er   An escalator is realised by a priority queue data structure that
makes the currently heighest bid ie the bid with the heighest current priority
readily available The resource is always awarded to the highest bid
The height of the initial bid and the escalation rate of the chosen escalator con
sequently reect the priority of a task Given uctuating prices faster escalation
rates will generally result in higher average cost per time slice Bids placed on
fast escalators will pay a higher than average cost
Assume a stable price for timeslices equal to *p Then a zero initial bid placed on
an escalator with escalation rate er will receive a time fraction of the demanded
resource roughly equal to er*p
Price settlement
The EscalatingBid auction combines characteristics of the English and the
secondprice sealedbid auction The price settlement is done according to the
Vickrey principle
At the beginning of each time slice the auctioneer examines the top bid on each
escalator in the auction house The highest bid among them wins the resource
for this time slice and is charged with the amount of the secondhighest bid This
corresponds to the highest bid among all the other top bids and the follower of
the winning bid After deleting the winning bid its follower gets to the top of the
escalator

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Figure 	 The escalatingbid auction
Possible Extensions of the EscalatingBid Procedure
The number of parameters that are adjustable by the agents could be increased
Especially the initial bid could containbesides initial height and maximal
height of a bida kind of bidding strategy function For example time hori
zons for the period of validity of bids could be implemented in this function
It is conceivable to give an agent the option to update his bidding strategy in
certain time intervals when its local plan and thus its valuation for the resource
has changed
Analysis
The escalatingbid auction seems wellsuited to resource scheduling problems It
avoids the sleepingbidder problem of the classical progressive auctions EA DA
because the agents do not need to instantaneously keep track of the auctioning
process Also it ensures that a resource can be awarded or assigned at any time
crucial when the commodity to be sold is quite perishable Hence it avoids the
starvation problem
 
of the classical sealedbid auctions VA FP
Since the demand for processor time is apt to uctuate rapidly proper incentives
require rapidly uctuating prices Fluctuating prices can provide incentives for
delaying less urgent tasks leveling loads and so forth
 
A perishable resource is available but for some reasons there exists no bid for it and the
resource decayskeeps unused

Chapter 
Application Example The
Transportation Domain
Over the past few years the scheduling of transportation orders had been es
tablished as an important eld of application for Distributed Articial Intelli
gence both from an academic and from a practical perspective cf Wellman 
Sandholm  Fischer et al b Fischer et al  It oers interesting complex
ity properties an inherent distribution of knowledge and control natural possi
bilities to study coordination and cooperation and nally there is a considerable
economic interest in obtaining good solutions for these kinds of problems
In the following sections we give a brief description of the transportation domain
and the two systems COmoves and MasMars Subsequently we characterise
the transportation domain using the denitions of Rosenschein and Zlotkin as
a guideline Zlotkin  Rosenschein  Rosenschein  Zlotkin a It turns out
that we have to modify Denition    of Chapter  slightly to gather the domain
Furthermore it turns out to be useful to divide the class of taskoriented domains
into two classes cooperative and competitive taskoriented domains The trans
portation domain provides examples for both categories of taskoriented domains
In Section 	 we introduce some concepts to model market prices costs and
utility that provides the foundations for trading transportation tasks between
shipping companies
Section 		 discusses the practicability of the auctionbased negotiation mecha
nisms explained in Chapter  in the context of the shipping domain
 The Domain of Application
This section provides an overview of the transportation domain Important pre
vious results are summarised and related work is discussed
 
 Modelling the Transportation Domain as a Multia
gent System
The domain of application is the planning and scheduling of transportation orders
which is done in everyday life by human dispatchers in transportation companies
Many of the problems which must be solved in this area such as the Travelling
Salesman and related scheduling problems are known to be NPhard Moreover
not only since justintime production has come up planning must be performed
under a high degree of uncertainty and incompleteness and it is highly dynamic
In reality these problems are far from being solved
Cooperation and coordination both inside a single transportation company and
between several companies seem to be two very important processes that may
help to overcome the problems sketched above Indeed they are of increasing im
portance even in the highly competitive transportation business of today Using
the MasMars system several patterns of cooperation such as the announce
ment of unbooked legs order broking and dierent strategies for information ex
changes have been experimentally evaluated Kuhn et al  Fischer et al a
The multiagent approach to solve this problems is to employ two basic types
of agents corresponding to the physical entities in the domain transportation
companies and trucks Companies can communicate with their trucks and with
each other The user can dynamically dedicate transportation orders to specic
companies Looking upon trucks as agents allows us to delegate problemsolving
skills to them such as routeplanning and local plan optimisation The shipping
company agent has to allocate orders to its trucks while trying to satisfy the
constraints provided by the user as well as local optimality criteria costs A
company also may decide to cooperate with another company instead of having an
order executed by its own trucks Each truck agent is associated with a particular
shipping company from which it receives orders of the form Load amount a
 
of
good g
 
at location l
 
and transport it to location l

while satisfying
time constraints fc
t

     c
t
k
g More formally the setting can be described
as follows
S  fS
 
     S
l
g l  IN  is the set of shipping company agents
L  fL
S

    L
S
l
g  ffL
S

 
     L
S

m

g     fL
S
l
 
     L
S
l
m

gg m
i
 IN  is the set
of truck agents
 
 where the set L
S
i
species the truck agents of shipping
company S
i
 Each truck has only a limited capacity
O  fo
 
     o
n
g n  IN  is a set of orders Each order is specied by a tuple
a g l
 
 l

 c
t

     c
t
k
 where a is the amount g the type of the good l
 
the
source l

the destination and c
t

     c
t
k
are time constraints The orders
are announced to individual shipping companies at a specic point in time
 
To avoid name clashes we use L for the set of trucks derived from the British word lorry
  
Only in a test setting the whole set of orders will be specied in advance
In a system running in the real world the set of orders will dynamically
increase
Within the MAS group at the DFKI two implementations of the system were
developed MasMars and COmoves 
MasMars is implemented in DFKIOz The essential goal of MasMars is
to produce good results for the transportation scheduling problems
COmoves is the reimplementation of MasMars using the multiagent devel
opment shell DASEDIS The main focus of COmoves was the development
of market and auction models and the analysis of dynamic aspects of the
execution of tour plans
  Related Work and Previous Results
A basic research area dealing with these problems is Operations Research OR
An overview of the work done to solve the scheduling problem for the trans
portation domain is given in Bodin et al  For a more recent approach see
Psaraftis  It turns out that there are problems with these approaches when
the number of constraints to deal with grows or when realtime response of the
system is required This is the case if such a system is to be used in order to
support a dispatcher who has to tell customers an estimated cost of a delivery
For this class of problems knowledgebased approaches as the one by Bagchi and
Nag Bagchi  Nag   are often used Within their system global optimisation
is reduced to assigning a new shipment to a contract with minimal incremental
cost caused by that insertion This is based on a result of Psaraftis Psaraftis 
who shows that in a dynamic scheduling environment global minimisation over
a period of time is best achieved by minimising the incremental cost of each
assignment
A distributed ORbased approach is that of Bachem et al Bachem et al 
They present a parallel improvement heuristic for solving vehicle routing problems
with side constraints is presented The solution to this problem is constructed
using a procedure called Simulated Trading where each tour of a truck can
be assigned to a specic processor of a parallel computer A further example
for distributed OR approaches can be found in Falk et al  They pursue an
approach integrating knowledgebased mechanisms and OR algorithms to model
tramp agent companies Compared to our modelling this approach represents
a specic instance of our domain namely a single company which is geograph
ically distributed Thus the dispatching agents are willing to exchange all the
information in this case the complete route plans in a cooperation process
 
Zlotkin  Rosenschein  Rosenschein  Zlotkin a gave a decision theoretic
classication of domains and presented general results for dierent classes task
oriented domains stateoriented domains and worthoriented domains For the
class of taskoriented domains they introduce the delivery domain and the post
men domain which are both quite similar to the transportation domain However
on the one hand we will see that the analysis of the transportation domain will
lead us to dierent denitions from the ones given by Rosenschein and Zlotkin
On the other hand Rosenschein and Zlotkin concentrate on the decision theo
retic perspective in these application domains whereas our work tries to join the
work done on solving complex scheduling problems and the results developed in
decision theory
To give an overview of the current state of the art of the MasMars system
we will briey recall major previous results In Kuhn et al  the architecture
of the basic simulation system was described and a negotiation protocol which
allows companies to avoid unbooked legs by oering specic orders to other com
panies was specied Fischer et al b contains an empirical analysis of how
dierent types of cooperation namely vertical horizontal and enhanced coop
eration inuence the performance of the system as a whole The major result
was that by employing horizontal cooperation among shipping companies in a
straightforward manner cost savings of about + could be achieved Finally
in Fischer et al  the results of a benchmark test Desrochers et al  are
described in which we compared our solution for a specic problem the static
vehicle routing problem with time windows to the solutions found by several
heuristic OR algorithms From this experiments we learned that theMasMars
system produced solutions close to the optimum of a quality that is generally
comparable to heuristic OR approaches in other cases Moreover MasMars is
able to solve dynamic scheduling problems which are beyond the scope of the OR
algorithms used in the benchmark
In Pischel et al 	 the CoMOVES system which is a reimplementation of the
MasMars system is described The results of the project COmovesII are
presented in Siekmann et al 

  Analysis of the Transportation Domain
In this Section the transportation domain is analysed as a taskoriented domain
as proposed by Zlotkin  Rosenschein 
  Denition and Basic Properties
Tasks are the main focus of the problem solving and negotiation process in the
transportation domain therefore it is intuitive to classify it as a taskoriented
domain TOD Unfortunately our domain does not quite match the original
 
denition of a TOD as given in Denition    of Chapter  It is easy to see that
a single truck with limited loading capacity is not able to execute arbitrary many
transportation tasks Furthermore there exist trucks with dierent abilities such
that the cost function is not the same for all truck agents
Additionally an important feature of the transportation domain is that a ship
ping company will be paid money for each task it performs For this reason
we introduce the notion of a price for TODs At a rst glance this seems to
be a technical detail nonetheless as we will see below it allows an important
further classication of TODs One could argue that Rosenschein and Zlotkin
introduced the notion of price worth in worthoriented domains WOD which
is in fact a superclass of the taskoriented domains However in WODs worth
is assigned to goal states rather than to single tasks which is less desirable for
the transportation domain
We continue with a redenition of the task oriented domains The main dierence
to Denition    is that the cost function distinguishes between the agents and
that it is allowed to assign innite costs to a set of tasks which means that it is
impossible to perform it for that agent
Denition   A Task Oriented Domain TOD is a tuple ,   T A C 
where
 T is the set of all possible tasks
 A  fA
 
     A
n
g is an ordered list of agents
 C  fc
 
     c
n
g is a set of functions c
i
 
T
 IR

 fg such that for
each nite set of tasks X  T  c
i
X is the cost for agent A
i
to execute
all the tasks in X All c
i
are monotonic ie for any two nite subsets
X  Y  T  c
i
X  c
i
Y 
 c
i
  F
i
are the x costs of agent A
i
 For simplicity we assume F
i
 i
To be able to assign a price to individual tasks we extend Denition   by a price
function p
Denition  Let ,   T AB  be a TOD A price function for , is a
function p  
T
 IR

 For each nite subset X 
 T holds
pX   





P
t X
(pt if X  
 otherwise
where (pt is the price to be paid to an agent for task t Throughout this chapter
we will write ,   T AB p  for a TOD , with price function p
 
The utility an agent A
i
obtains for performing any given subset of tasks X 
 T
is dened by
tut
i
X   pX  c
i
X 
Agents in TODs dened according to Denition   will always try to avoid ex
ecuting tasks because saving costs increases their utility Agents in the TODs
dened according to denition  have a desire to execute tasks in our applica
tion domain transportation orders because doing so will increase their utility
if the price exceeds the costs The real trick for the agents is to execute tasks at
minimal costs
Rosenschein and Zlotkin characterise TODs specifying several attributes they
can have the weakest of which is subadditivity We rene the denition for our
purposes
Denition  Subadditivity Let ,   T AB p  be a TOD , is called
 locally subadditive if for all nite sets of tasks X Y 
 T and every agent
A
i
 A we have
c
i
X  Y  c
i
X  ! c
i
Y
 globally subadditive if for all nite sets of tasks X Y 
 T and for any
agents A
i
 A
j
 A
k
 A we have
c
i
X  Y  c
j
X  ! c
k
Y
For the price function we require that
pX  Y  pX  ! pY
Theorem  If no time constraints are specied for the transportation orders
 the transportation domain is a locally subadditive TOD
 the transportation domain is not a globally subadditive TOD
Proof Idea For   the key observation is that an agent can benet from
joining two round trips into a single round trip Note that this assertion remains
true even if capacity constraints ie restrictions of the amount a truck agent can
carry at a time are considered However in this case the probability that an
agent really benets from joining two round trips decreases For  it is easy to
construct an example in which two trucks located in two geographically distinct
locations can execute two sets of orders at less costs than any of them could do
on its own  
Theorem  If time constraints are specied for the transportation orders the
transportation domain is not locally subadditive
 	
   
    
 
A
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
o1: A -> B
o2: C -> D
o3: E -> F
o4: G -> H
Figure 	  If time constraints are specied the transportation domain is not
locally subadditive
Proof Because this result is less obvious than the previous one we give the
proof via a more detailed example shown in Figure 	  In the example four
orders are specied The due date dda of an order is the latest point in time
the truck is allowed to nish the order Let t
cur
denote the current time The
four orders are given by
o
 
 A B dda
o

 t
cur
! timeneededA B
o

 C  D dda
o

 t
cur
! timeneededA B  C  D
o

 E  F dda
o

 t
cur
! timeneededA B  C  D  E  F 
o

 G H dda
o

 t
cur
! timeneededA B  C  E  F  G H
The orders all together do not exceed the capacity of one truck and no further
time constraints are specied This means that the trucks do not have to worry
about being early in a specic city All they have to care about is not being late
Therefore the best routes for two trucks starting in city A are
A B  E  F  A and A C  D  G H  A
The only possible route satisfying the time constraints for one truck executing
all the orders is
A B  C  D E  F  G H  A
For these routes we have
cA B  E  F  A ! cA C  D G H  A
 cA B  C  D E  F  G H  A
 

This is due to the fact that the following inequations hold for the example
cA C ! cB  E ! cD  G  cB  C
cF  A  cD E ! cF  G
If the distances B  C D  E and F  G are increased while keeping the
distances A C B  E and D  G constant the dierence in costs between
the two solutions can grow without any bound  
It follows from these two results that our setting is in the range of general to
subadditive TODs according to the denition in Rosenschein  Zlotkin a de
pending on the specication of the orders We will come back to this point later
   Encounters and Deals in the Transportation Do
main
In Rosenschein  Zlotkin a an encounter is an initial distribution of tasks to
the agents and a deal is a redistribution of the tasks as an negotiation outcome
Because of the dynamic nature of the transportation domain and the necessity
of regarding side payings we dene as in Fischer  Muller 
 an encounter as a
distribution of tasks and for each agent the side paying he receives from or owes
to the other agents So an encounter is not only the initial distribution of tasks
but can also be a deal a redistribution the agents agreed on
Denition  An encounter within a TOD  T AB p  is a totally ordered
list T
 
 T

     T
n
 such that for all k  f      ng T
k
 
T
 IR We dene two
access functions to the elements of an encounter tasksT
k
 
 T is a nite set of
tasks that A
k
needs to achieve and spT
k
 the sidepayment agent A
k
will receive
spT
k
 can be negative However
P
n
i 
spT
i
   must hold
The global order scheduling problem of nding good solutions for a given situation
can be decomposed into two steps which can be analysed separately The rst
question is how orders should be distributed among shipping companies The
second one is how orders can be allocated within one shipping company among
its set of trucks Therefore in MasMars encounters are dened at two levels
Firstly at the layer of the shipping companies an encounter species which set
of tasks is assigned to which shipping company Secondly on the layer of the
trucks in each shipping company an encounter species how the set of tasks
which is currently assigned to a specic shipping company is distributed among
the trucks of this shipping company If we assume that there are n  IN shipping
companies the distribution of the current task is specied by n!   encounters



One within each company plus one among the companies
 
In fact this allocation is the solution to a very complex scheduling problem In
MasMars this solution is initially computed by a contractnetlike negotiation
mechanism between the shipping companies and their trucks This initial solution
is further optimised using negotiation mechanisms based on the notion of deals
Fischer  Muller 	
Denition  Let ,   T  fA
 
     A
n
gB p  be an nagent TOD let
T
 
     T
n
 be an encounter within , A deal is a redistribution of tasks among
agents It is an encounter D
 
     D
n
 such that tasksD
 
     tasksD
n
 
 T 
and that
S
n
i 
tasksD
i
  
S
n
i 
tasksT
i
 The semantics of such a deal is that
each agent A
k
commits itself to executing all tasks in tasksD
k

Given an encounter T
 
     T
n
 within a TOD  T  fA
 
     A
n
g c p  we have
the following
  For any deal 
    k  n the deal utility for agent A
k
is dened by
dut
k

  tuttasks

k
 ! sp

k
 tuttasksT
k
 spT
k

 The initial encounter '  T
 
     T
n
 is called the conict deal and remains
unchanged if no agreement can be reached
The variable sp in an encounter is only used in negotiation processes among
shipping companies In the dynamic case where orders are announced to the
system at random points in time the system starts with an encounter where
each of the task sets in the encounter is the empty set and all balances are equal
to  The sidepayments may change within negotiation processes when an agent
buys an order from another agent Their purpose is to express how much the
agent has gained from the encounter
Denition 
 For vectors   
 
 

     
n
 and 	  	
 
 	

     	
n
 we say
that  dominates 	 and write   	 i
 k 
k
 	
k
 and l 
l
 	
l
 We say
that  dominates 	 weakly and write   	 i
 k 
k
 	
k

We adopt the notion of dominance for deals for deals 
 and 
 we say that 

dominates 


 written as

  


i dut
 

     dut
n

  dut
 



     dut
n




We say that 
 dominates 


weakly and write

  


i dut
 

     dut
n

  dut
 



 dut
n




Deal 
 is individually rational for all agents if 
  ' and pareto optimal if there is
no other deal 


such that 


 
 One possibility to nd out if a given encounter
 
is pareto optimal is to prove it using a branch and bound algorithm However
in general this procedure is much too timeconsuming Therefore we introduce
the notion of weak pareto optimality a deal 
 is weakly pareto optimal if no agent
is able to compute a deal 


which dominates 
 within a specied time limit The
set of all deals which are individual rational and weakly pareto optimal is called
negotiation set
Based on the notion of weak pareto optimality it is possible to dene an anytime
algorithm Boddy  Dean  for schedule optimisation If we assume that in the
transportation domain the set of tasks T is given by all tasks which are present
at a specic point in time the set of all possible encounters has an enormous size
Starting with some encounter T
 
     T
n
 which is not weakly pareto optimal in
general we have dened negotiation strategies which will lead to weakly pareto
optimal solutions Fischer  Muller 	
  Cooperative vs Competitive TODs
We are now at the point to rene the denition of a TOD leading to two sub
classes that each describe important cases of TODs with dierent properties
Denition  A TOD ,   T AB p  is called
 a competitive TOD if an agent A
k
only accepts a deal 
 if dut
k

  
 a cooperative TOD if the agents accept a deal 
 if
P
n
i 
dutD
i
  
According to this denition task allocation within one shipping company de
scribes a cooperative TOD because trucks of one shipping company switch or
ders even if one of them obtains less utility by the deal than it had before In
this situation it is possible to dene negotiation protocols that result in surpris
ingly good solutions Bachem et al  Results from an analysis of cooperative
TODs have been published in Fischer et al  Fischer  Muller 	 For the
rest of this section we concentrate on the competitive setting which describes
task allocation among dierent shipping companies
 Lying in the Transportation Domain
The way the utility is divided among the agents is not the only dierence
between the cooperative and competitive setting In a competitive setting it
is not very likely that agents always tell the truth It has been shown in
Zlotkin  Rosenschein  Rosenschein  Zlotkin a that lying in subadditive
and general TODs may be benecial
 
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       
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  
   
 
 
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SA SB
o1: C -> D
o2: A -> D o3: B -> D
Figure 	 Example lies may be benecial
 Phantom Tasks and Hidden Tasks
From the previous considerations we learned that the transportation domain is
on the verge between general and subadditive TODs However lying has dierent
eects in the two settings as in the TODs originally dened by Rosenschein and
Zlotkin agents try to avoid the execution of tasks whereas in our case agents are
eager to execute tasks
Theorem  In the transportation domain phantom lies may be benecial
The proof of Theorem  is accomplished by providing an example Assume that
there is a shipping company S
A
located in city A and a shipping company S
B
located in city B see Figure 	 Let o
 
be an order of t from C to D oered
to S
A
and o

an order of t from B to D oered to S
B
 The distances the trucks
have to go is computed as the Euclidean distance between the points of the cities
in the pictures We assume that the costs are proportional to the distances
The utilities for this initial encounter are
tut
S
A
o
 
  po
 
 cACDA
tut
S
B
o

  po

 cBDB
One can see that S
B
can perform o
 
with less costs then S
A
 The cost savings
from this redistribution are
-  cACDA ! cBDB cBCDB
Hence a product maximising mechanism would exactly halve this utility and
choose the deal that species a sidepaying of
  tut
S
A
o
 
 !
-

  
the utility S
A
would have reached on its own plus 	 percent of the common
savings as a fair outcome
Now consider the case that S
A
invents the phantom order o

from A to D It
would still be rational for S
A
to sell the order o
 
to S
B
 Now the apparent cost
savings are
-

 cACDA ! cBDB cADA cBCDB
Therefore a PMM will choose


 tut
S
A
o
 
 o

 tut
S
A
o

 !
-


as sidepaying for the task o
 
 Since


   tut
S
A
o
 
 o

 tut
S
A
o

 !



 tut
S
A
o
 
 !



 po
 
 ! po

 cACDA po

 cADA
po
 
 cACDA !




 cADA !
 

cACDA ! cBDB cADA cBCDB

 

cACDA ! cBDB cBCDB
 cADA
cADA

is always positive we are through  
Theorem  In the transportation domain hiding tasks may be benecial
For this proof we refer again to Figure 	 We now assume that S
B
conceals the
order o

 Still it would be rational to sell the order o
 
to S
B
 So the overall prot
of the cooperation seems to be
-

 cACDA cBCDB
Hence the side paying S
A
receives chosen by a PMM is


 tut
S
A
o
 
 !
-



Since -

 - also 

  therefore the lie turns out to be benecial for S
B
 
   
 Price Determination in Transportation
Companies
In the last decades the transportation market in Germany developed a free and
atomistic structure with many small and medium sized haulage companies and
customers A single company or customer has no noticeable inuence on the
market The ware that is traded is transportation capacity that is oered by
haulage companies and that is requested by the customers The customers can
be industrial corporations or other transportation companies The decisions for
the prices and the costs for transportation capacity depend on several parameters
such as distance time the used transportation device etc
A customer of a haulage company is anyone who submits a transportation order
to the company We just model the few relevant attributes of an order For
example we assume a single type of good that is diversible in tons or meters
ofloading The price the client pays for the execution of the order is due to
negotiations between him and the shipping company Usually it tends to the
average market price The market price depends on various parameters and it is
inuenced by the actions of every company in the market It depends on various
parameters and is a highly dynamical statistical value
The actual value of the market price varies with supply and demand For our
scenario it has been sucient to treat it as a x value Of course the concrete
prices depend on the actual situation nevertheless the market price can help to
determine a maximal limit for the price and to distinguish between protable and
nonprotable orders
 Market Price
Let a be an order oered to shipping company S W a S is the price that S
is payed for executing a If the customer is not a shipping company itself we
assume that the price equals the market price Ma
Let Cost be the costfunction the company uses to compute its costs for executing
the task The costs are independent of the price of the order and can be computed
in several ways
We chose to dene the costs of a transportation task as the costs of that truck of
the company that can perform the task best In COmoves we used a simple cost
model based on the minimal additional way a truck had to go In COmovesII we
presented a more elaborated statistical cost model Siekmann et al 

Denition  Let a  A be an order and S  S a transportation company
W a S is the price S receives for the execution of a Let Cost  A  S  R
be the costfunction the companies uses to compute the costs for the execution of
the orders using their own trucks The prot G  A  S  R is the di
erence
between the price and the costs Ga S  W a S Costa S
  
In general the market price is an upper bound for the price and thus for the
prot Since the costs are independent of the price the prot can be negative if
the costs exceed the price
  Modelling the Additional Costs
This cost model has been used to nd the best resource for an order on the basis
of additional distance that has to be covered for this order
Denition  Let t be a truck o  O an order .  P a plan consisting of a set
of plan steps p
i
 . and let .
o
 be the set of extensions of plan . that include
the execution of o d is the function that assigns to every plan step p
i
its distance
dp
i
 The function c  P  R computes the total distance a plan . covers
c.  
X
p
i
 
dp
i

Let v
t
be a constant that species the variable costs of a truck t in dependence of
the distance it covered Now we can dene the function Cost  O  P  IR that
computes the costs of adding a new order o to an existing plan . as follows
Costo.  min
 
o
c c.  v
t
The following example serves to illustrate this way of computation of costs
Example   Consider two orders o
 
 o

 a truck with capacity t and as
in  a map labelled with kilometredistances The variable costs are v  
 DMKM In the initial situation the truck is located at the depot and has
no loading and an empty plan Let o
 
be an order of transporting  t from A
to C and o

a order of 	t from C to the depot It is obvious that the tour
Depot A  C Depot is the best solution for the truck According to the
specied cost measure its costs are
Costo
 
 o

   distDepot A !   ! distCDepot  v
 
 km   DMkm
  
 DM
In gure  we relate the capacity utilisation to the distance
Using the costmodel we described above we obtain for the orders o
 
and o

the
following costs
  
tour
D A C D
40
500
D
A
B
C120
300
200
150
110
Figure 	 A tour
Costo
 
  distDepot A ! distAC ! distCDepot   v
 
 km  km   DM%km
  
 DM
Costo

  distDepot A !    distDepot A !     v
 
 km 
 km   DM%km
  DM
Evaluation
The example shows the advantages and shortcomings of this approach The
advantages are
  The cost model is perfect to decide which resource is the best at the actual
time point
  It is easy to compute
  It is adapted to the current situation
Nevertheless the model is not capable for the computation of real prices for
transportation tasks
  
  There is no fair allocation of costs to transportation orders
  The same tasks announced in a dierent sequence may result in dierent
costs
  It is possible that the costs  are assigned to orders
 Adequate Modelling of Costs
Before we introduce the statistical cost model we summarise the requirements for
an adequate cost model
  The cost model should be easy to compute
  It should be stable and produce good results over a relatively long time
  It should be pessimistic in that it should rather overestimate than under
estimate the costs
  On the basis of the volume or weight and the distance between the location
of loading and unloading it should allow a fair allocation of costs to orders
  It should allow a fair allocation of unbooked legs to the orders
  The cost model should oer the possibilities to react to the actual situation
eg with special oers
unbooked
leg
a3
a1
a2 unbooked
leg
capacity utilization gap
maximal capacity
time/distance
Figure 	 A Tour Diagram
  	
Figure 	 is an example for a schematic representation of a tour The maximal
performance of transportation that could be reached during that tour is symbol
ised by the outer rectangle It is the product of the capacity of the truck and the
covered distance
MaxPer  MaxCap MaxWay  MaxCap 
X
dp
i

The actual performance of transportation is the sum of the volume of the rect
angles that symbolise the actual performed orders
Per  
X
dp
i
  gp
i

It is known empirically that trucks are seldom completely utilised We call that
amount of capacity that usually stays unused the statistical capacity utilisation
gap Many shipping companies aspire no complete utilisation but one that is re
duced according to that gap Therefore a truck may be regarded as full although
there is some capacity left
The proportion of unbooked legs can as well be computed as statistical value
Hence we can relate the total driven distance to the distance that is directly
connected with orders
 The Statistic Market Model
We are now introducing a cost model that enables us to compute some time in
advance an approximation of the costs an order causes when it is executed This
model relies exclusively on statistic information
Denition 	 Let t be a truck o  O an order g the function that assigns to
the orders its weight d
m
the function that assigns to every order the minimal
distance from the location of loading to the location of unloading The constant
v
t
represents the variable costs of the truck t
c
l
is the statistical value that species the proportion of unbooked legs and the
total distance c
k
species the proportion of the average capacity utilisation and
the maximal capacity
Now we dene the cost function
Costo  go 
 
c
k
 d
m
o 
 
c
l
 v
t
The following parameters used in this model are statistical or directly related to
the order They are not related to other orders or to the actual situation
  The weight of the order
  

  The minimal distance between the locations of loading and unloading
  The capacity of the truck
  The approximated values for the statistical capacity utilisation gap and the
proportion of unbooked legs
Evaluation
This approach oers the following advantages
  Simplicity The cost function is easy to compute
  Adaptive modelling It is possible to implement a selfadaptive version
of the scenario It is necessary to protocol the orders and the sum of the
costs for executing them to recompute the statistical values
  Disturbances It is easy to simulate disturbances in the market There
fore it is possible to analyse the stability of the approach
  Unbooked legs The assignment of the costs of unbooked legs to orders
is fair
  Market price It is possible to approximate the market price automati
cally in the system
The main shortcoming of the statistical cost model is that the choice of the
parameter c
l
and c
k
is rather arbitrary in the beginning Using a selfadapting
version should overcome this problem soon Naturally to reach realistic results
it is necessary to use realistic sets of orders Hence one should carefully choose
the orders if the results are of realworld relevance
 The Negotiation Situation
In the transportation domain the standard negotiation situation is the following
one agenteither the customer or a shipping companyhas a transportation
task to perform while there are several companies that are able to perform the
task at reasonable costs Thus the aim of a negotiation mechanism is to nd that
company which can perform the task at the lowest costs and to negotiate a fair
distribution of the prot between the buyer and the seller of the task Hence we
obtain a onetomany negotiation situation with the price for an order as a single
topic Therefore singleitem auction protocols are appropriate mechanisms
In this section we evaluate whether the singleitem auction protocols we presented
in Chapter  can be used for the negotiation in the transportation domain
  
For simplicity we assume that there are no dependencies between the dierent
negotiations Of course this assumption is not realistic but otherwise we would
not be able to do any signicant analysis of protocols In particular we introduced
the following limitations
  The agents cannot use information about the other agents they might have
obtained from earlier negotiations
  The agents do not commit themselves to any actions that do not concern
the current negotiation It is not possible to trade favours Every utility
transfer must be explicit using the concept of side paying
  We do not want to model behaviour that is not rational in short term but
that might pay of in the long term like oering unnecessary concessions to
a partner to establish a good relationship or oer dumping prices with the
goal to ruin the competitors
  Furthermore we treat the statistical values as well as the market price
as constant throughout a single negotiation because we assume that the
volume of a single order is too small to cause signicant changes
 Evaluation of the Auction Protocols
We will now discuss the appropriateness of the following protocols in the trans
portation domain We decided to restrict our attention to the three classical
auctions and the Vickrey mechanism which are the basics for the more elabo
rated single item auctions
  FirstBidFirstPrice the ContractNet Protocol
  FirstBidSecondPrice Protocol the Vickrey Auction
  Open English Auction
  Open Dutch Auction
The dominant strategy for the bidder participating in the Vickrey auction is
to reveal their true appraisal of the oered object ie the maximal price they
would be willing to pay If every bidder acts rationally the outcome of the Vickrey
auction is exactly the appraisal of that bidder with the second highest appraisal
of the object The English auction converges to the same result if we assume
an innitesimal width of steps The results of the other two auctions may dier
from that value if the bidders are not able to assess the appraisal of the others
The more the bidders know about each other the nearer the result will be to the
second appraisal Hence theoretically if we assume that the bidders have enough
  
costs of costs of revealed
computation communication information
Contract Net high low medium
Vickrey Auction low low high
English Auction low high medium
Dutch Auction high high low
Figure 		 Evaluation of the auctions
information about each other and that the steps are small all the auctions produce
the same result However in the real world the results can dier quite a lot We
analyse the auctions according to the following criteria
Costs of computation For the participants of a Vickrey or an English auction
the strategies are straightforward just reveal the true appraisal resp just
keep bidding until it is reached On the other hand for rational bidders in
the Dutch auction or the contract net it is necessary to invest eort in the
detection or estimation of the appraisals of the other bidders This can be
done by the use of experiences eg based on statistics or if possible even
by espionage
Costs of communication The contract net and the Vickrey auction get by
with a little amount of communication while the Dutch and English auc
tion need comparatively much communication eort In the shipping do
main time is expensive and therefore the amount of communication is an
important factor Usually a dispatcher decides after a few telephone calls
whether to sell an order or not Of course this factor looses importance if
the agents are nonhuman and dispose of fast communication devices
Revealed information In a extremely competitive domains like the trans
portation domain information can be of essential relevance Especially if
the auctioneer is a shipping company itself and therefore a competitor
of the bidders an auction form that gives him too much insight into the
internal state of the bidders is generally not acceptable Therefore in such
domains the Vickrey auction is only applicable if a totally trusted third
party adopts the role of the auctioneer
Table 		 summarises this results
Assuming a trustworthy auctioneer we can take the rst and the second of the
above criteria as crucial and so the Vickrey auction can be rated as best and
  
the Dutch auction as worst Because of that we decided to integrate the Vickrey
mechanism in the COmoves system
Attaching more importance to the criterion of revealed information the Dutch
auction gains desirability because the bidders are barely exposed Especially
if the appraisal of the bidders and the auctioneer are not constant but change
over time an auction mechanism that can deal with time seems to be benecial
Fischer and Muller Fischer  Muller 
 introduced a model for the dynamical
change of appraisals of tasks in dependence of the possibility to receive additional
tasks and the latest possible time point for the execution A mechanism similar to
the Dutch auction is proposed as a possibility to deal with dynamically changing
appraisals
  A Negotiation Strategy for Competing Shipping
Companies
Let us consider again the example we had before 	
 The shipping companies
S
A
and S
B
are located in A resp B and the task o
 
 an order of  from C  D
is to oered to S
A
 Now we can distinguish the following cases
  If nothing else is known and both shipping companies do not have further
orders to be executed a truck of shipping company S
B
would be the best
for executing the order We dene
-
S
A
 tut
S
A
o
 
  (po
 
 cA C  D  A
and
-
S
B
 tut
S
B
o
 
  (po
 
 cB  C  D B
where -
S
A
and -
S
B
specify the utility S
A
and S
B
receive by executing
the order We have -
S
A
 -
S
B
because C is closer to B than to A If
-
S
A
  it would not be rational for S
A
to give the order to S
B
without
being paid utility from S
B
 On the other hand in this situation it would
not be rational for S
A
to execute the order by itself S
A
could oer the
deal
!-
S
A
 fo
 
g-
S
A

to S
B
and it would not be rational of S
B
to reject this deal because it
obtains a utility of -
S
B
-
S
A
  from it
 Assume that S
A
already has an order o

of  from A  D S
B
does not
have any orders at all In this case it is not rational for S
A
to give the order
to S
B
 because
 
A B
C
D
       
  LA   
  
   
 
 
LB
SA SB
o1: C -> D
o2: A -> D o3: B -> D
Figure 	
 Example for the changes of appraisals of tasks
-

S
A
 -
S
B
 where -

S
A
 (po
 
 cA C  D ! cA D
holds and therefore S
B
is not able to pay S
A
a price which is higher than
the price A could get by executing the order on its own
Now assume that S
A
does not really have an order o

of  with source A
and destination D but there is a probability of + for getting such an
order Is it still rational for S
A
to execute the order o
 
on its own With a
probability of + S
A
receives more utility than it could get by selling the
order to S
B
 By computing the expected utility Haddawy  Hanks  for
both alternatives we can infer that keeping the order would be individual
rational for S
A

 The situation again changes if we assume that S
A
has an order o

of 
with source A and destination D and S
B
has an order o

of  with source
B and destination D In this situation S
B
is the best to execute the order
o
 
but it has to pay S
A
a high price for the order Hence S
B
will earn only
little money by executing o
 
because S
A
was already able to execute the
order at low costs
Now assume that both companies S
A
and S
B
do not really have the orders
o

and o

but have a + probability to get such an order In this case in
the beginning S
B
is the best one to execute the order With a probability
of + both will get the expected order and S
A
would lose utility if it
gave away the order without the assumption of getting the additional order
o

 There is a chance of + that both of them will not get the expected
additional order and a chance of + that only one of them will get the
additional order In both of the latter cases S
B
might lose utility if o
 
is
transferred for the price where S
A
assumed that it would have the additional
  
SB
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Figure 	 A timedependent decision function to determine the price of an order
in a negotiation process
order Is it rational for S
B
to buy the order At which price should S
B
buy
the order
To solve this problem one could try to compute expected utilities for sets of tasks
but this is rather awkward because the probability of being oered a specic set
of orders is not known beforehand We therefore suggest another solution to the
problem For this purpose we return to the situation where we have truck L
A
located in city A and truck L
B
located in city B There is only one order o
 
 units to transport from C to D present which was received by the shipping
company S
A
and is currently scheduled to truck L
A
 When L
A
executes the
order S
A
gets a utility of -
S
A
 A threshold utility - is specied which denes
the amount of utility a truck has to get to stop the shipping company from looking
for partners to execute the orders currently scheduled to the truck The situation
for the shipping company agent with respect to truck L
A
is now characterised by
gure 	 S
A
invents a phantom task o

which ideally completes order o
 
 in
the example  units to transport from A to D just at the time o
 
has to be
executed  and which gives S
A
a utility of -

S
A
 S
A
announces o
 
at time t


to
S
B
specifying the expected utility -

S
A
as a price to be paid if the order is to be
transferred Because -
S
B
is less than -

S
A
 S
B
does not accept this oer
While time passes and nothing changes signicantly ie no new orders arrive
at time t
 
S
A
starts to believe that the probability for an order to arrive which
can substitute o

decreases linearly Therefore S
A
continuously reduces the price
-

S
A
after t
 
 This continues at most until t

because this is the time when L
A
actually has to start executing the order to meet the specied time constraints
However at time t

we have -

S
A
 -
S
B
which signals that the deal is becoming
attractive for S
B
 It would not be individually rational for S
B
to buy the order
exactly at time t

because S
B
would pass all its utility to S
A
 But from the next
time on S
A
reduces the price of its oer it will be individually rational for S
B
to
accept the oer
For S
B
the question is now when is the right time to accept the oer Even if we
assume that S
B
knows t

 the time L
A
has to start executing o
 
 there could be
another shipping company waiting for its chance to get o
 
 For the sake of the
 
example let us assume that
-
S
A

-
S
B

In this case the price of

S
B

seems to be fair because it exactly splits the utility
between S
A
and S
B
 Therefore a general strategy a shipping company could
choose to negotiate about prices for orders is to wait until the price of the oer
is less or equal to half the utility the shipping company could get out of executing
the order
Although this is a quite robust negotiation strategy in practice this strategy is not
in a NashEquilibrium The problem is that at any time a shipping company who
has an advantage for executing a specic order mostly because of its location
is able to prot from this situation if it is aware of it More concretely if a
shipping company knows that it is able to execute an order at costs which are
signicantly lower than the costs of any other shipping company it can buy this
order spending less than half the utility it obtains by executing the order Still
if the market is quite big ie if there is a large number of shipping companies
the probability that one shipping company gets into such an outstanding position
is quite low Furthermore even if a shipping company is able to buy an order
without splitting the utility fairly the corresponding partner company does not
really lose utility because it is paid at least its expected utility
 The Integration of the Auction Protocols
and the Market Model
In COmovesII the market price is a direct consequence of the statistic cost model
that was presented in Section 	 We assume that a customer who awards
an order to a haulage company pays the market price So we restricted the
possibilities of price negotiation to negotiations between the companies when
trading tasks among each other In this negotiations the market price serves as
clue and limit
We analyse how these defaults inuence the strategies of the bidders in the con
tract net and the Vickrey auction Let o be an order Mo its market price
and cost
S
o the costs that the execution of o causes to company S We have to
distinguish the cases that the costs are lower resp higher than the market price
 Vickrey Auction
Bidding for a task in the Vickrey auction it is in general rational to reveal the
true execution costs We have to modify this rule if the costs exceed the market
price which is dened as a limit One solution is not to bid for tasks that are too
 
costs
M
bid
costs
M
bid
N
M M
Contract Net Vickrey Auction
Figure 	 The bidding according to the market model
costly to execute An alternative is to submit a bid at the level of the market price
and to risk the dierence between the bid and the market price as a loss This
may be rational if there are chances to receive additional tasks that t well in the
planned tour and therefore cause few costs and high prot In the aposteriori
evaluation the order that seemed to be unattractive in the beginning can turn
out to be quite fruitful Using this strategy the bid that company S submits for
order o is computed as follows
G
v
S
o  





cost
S
o if cost
S
o Mo
Mo ! cost
S
oMo if cost
S
o  Mo
We require       Thus we can guarantee that the function G
v
is strictly
monotonic increasing This guarantees that even if the order would cause costs
that exceed the market price for all bidders the bidder that could perform the
task with the least eort receives it
  Contract Net
The market price is a limit for the bids in the contract net as well As in the
Vickrey auction we choose the strategy of submitting a bid at the level of the
market price if the costs exceed it and hoping for additional tasks If the costs
are less than the market price a price between the costs and the market price has
to be chosen The price should be high enough to maximise the prot but low
enough to receive the order To avoid an expensive and speculative reasoning
about the bids of the other agents we introduce a factor   

S
   that states
how much of the dierence between the market price and the costs the bidder
 
claims as prot for himself
G
c
S
o  





cost
S
o ! 

S
Mo cost
S
o if cost
S
o Mo
Mo ! cost
S
oMo if cost
S
o  Mo
Figure 	 shows the bidding function in the contract net and the Vickrey auction
 	
Chapter 
Conclusion
A fundamental problem in multiagent research consists in the question of how
the singleagent behaviours within a group of selfinterested agents can be coor
dinated so that the overall group utility is maximised This research report gives
an overview of the decision and game theoretical concepts that are fundamental
for approaching this coordination problem By taking a closer look at the trans
portation domain in the last chapter it also shows that there is a great need for
these concepts in applicationoriented multiagent research
In order to be able to understand how selfinterested agents make decisions we
started with a brief introduction into decision theory as invented by von Neumann
and Morgenstern and payed special attention to the foundations of game theory
After that we took a look at the kinds of domains in which autonomous agents
can interact with each other We presented an approach of Rosenschein and
Zlotkin who utilise game theoretical results in order to classify multiagent do
mains in a threelevel hierarchy Outgoing from that they identied fair negoti
ation mechanisms that prevent deception in the dened domain classes Unfor
tunately they did not provide a comprehensive overview of negotiation protocols
that are suitable for fullling this purpose under incomplete information
In order to ll this gap we investigated the theory of coordination mechanism
design for theoretical foundations suitable for identifying deceptionpreventing
negotiation mechanisms We outlined that according to this theory the needed
negotiation mechanisms are incentivecompatible ones in which rationally act
ing selfinterested agents are enforced to reveal their preference informations to
each other truthfully In the following we were able to identify several incentive
compatible auctionbased negotiation protocols which can be used to yield out
comes that maximise social welfare in multiagent systems composed of rationally
behaving selfinterested agents
In the last chapter we presented the transportation domain as a fruitful exam
ple for the application of multiagent technologies to realworld problems We
extended the theoretical tools of Chapter  to enable an intense analysis of the
transportation domain and discovered that for selfinterested agents it may be
 

benecial to deceive other agents by lying about individual preferences
From this observation it should have become clear that the application of
incentivecompatible negotiation mechanisms is needed in order to design global
utility maximising multiagent systems for domains with competitive self
interested agents It also has become obvious that the concepts of game and
decision theory serve well in approaching coordination problems within the re
search area of multiagent systems
 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